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WHAT’S YOUR PRIORITY?: REVITALIZING PENNSYLVANIA’S
APPROACH TO EQUITABLE SUBROGATION OF
MORTGAGES AFTER FIRST COMMONWEALTH
BANK v. HELLER
GLENN R. MCGILLIVRAY*
“[E]quitable subrogation simply seeks to maintain the proper order of
priorities . . . keeping the first mortgage first and the second
mortgage second.”1
I. FIRST THINGS FIRST: INTRODUCTION TO REFINANCING AND PRIORITY
LIEN POSITION FOR MORTGAGE LOANS
As the housing market began to crash in 2008, Jan, a single mother of
three, found her most prized possession—her home—threatened by fore-
closure.2  After losing her job because of the economic downturn, she was
forced to deplete her savings to keep up with her monthly bills.3  She soon
fell behind on her mortgage payments, leaving her with a difficult deci-
sion: save her home from foreclosure or continue putting food on the
table for her children.4  A saving grace presented itself when a third party
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Villanova University School of Law.  I would like to
thank attorney Scott Rothman for providing me with the idea for this Note.  I
would also like to thank Professor David Caudill for his insight and guidance in the
writing process.  Finally, I would like to thank the members of the Villanova Law
Review for their helpful feedback and continuous effort in the production of this
Note.
1. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Prestance Corp., 160 P.3d 17, 20 (Wash. 2007) (en
banc) (adopting Restatement approach with regard to equitable subrogation and
holding that lender can be equitably subrogated to first-priority lien despite having
actual or constructive notice of junior lienholders).
2. See generally Craig E. Pollack & Julia F. Lynch, Op-Ed., Foreclosures Are Killing
Us, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/03/opinion/
foreclosures-are-killing-us.html (illustrating vast impact of foreclosure crisis that
caused record number of foreclosures).  Foreclosure may properly be character-
ized as a “bona fide public health crisis,” as it often results from the illness of
homeowners. Id. (“When breadwinners become ill, they miss work, lose their jobs,
face daunting medical bills—and have trouble making mortgage payments as a
result.”). Furthermore, foreclosure itself has adverse health effects on homeown-
ers, including increases in anxiety and depression. See id.
3. See generally Renae Merle & Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Mortgage Foreclosures
Reach All-Time High, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/06/AR2008030601447.html (noting that more
homeowners had fallen into foreclosure than ever before).
4. See generally RealtyTrac Staff, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent In 2008,
REALTYTRAC (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/
foreclosure-activity-increases-81-percent-in-2008-4551 (reporting approximately 3.2
million foreclosure filings in 2008 from U.S. Foreclosure Market Report).
(301)
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lender contacted her about refinancing her loan.5  The lender would pro-
vide lower monthly payments on her mortgage by lowering the interest
rate and extending the date of fulfillment.6  With this help, Jan was able to
make the new monthly payments once she returned to work, and she
avoided foreclosure altogether.7
During the mortgage crisis, many Americans faced a similar predica-
ment.8  After the housing bubble burst and the economy sank into reces-
sion, monthly loan payments soared out of reach for many homeowners.9
5. See generally Survivors Club Staff, Refinance While House Is in Foreclosure, SURVI-
VORS CLUB, http://www.thesurvivorsclub.org/money/surviving-foreclosure/refi-
nance-while-house-is-in-foreclosure (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (explaining
advantages provided by refinancing when home is in foreclosure).
6. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz & Mark Zandi, Op-Ed., The One Housing Solu-
tion Left: Mass Mortgage Refinancing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2012), http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/08/13/opinion/the-one-housing-solution-left-mass-mortgage-
refinancing.html?scp=1&sq=&st=nyt&_r=0 (“More than four million Americans
ha[d] lost their homes since housing bubble began bursting . . . .  [And] [a]n
additional 3.5 million homeowners are in the foreclosure process or are so delin-
quent on payments that they will be soon.”).  With interest rates at record lows,
mass mortgage refinancing would allow homeowners to drastically reduce their
monthly payments and significantly lessen the chance of default. See id. (highlight-
ing importance of refinancing).  Moreover, mass refinancing is economically bene-
ficial because over half of American homeowners are strong candidates for it, and,
accordingly, stand to increase disposable income and spending. See id.
7. See Gil Mackey, The Importance of Refinancing: Getting it Right, MORTGAGE
CREDIT PROBLEMS, http://www.mortgagecreditproblems.com/articles/refinanc-
ing/the-importance-of-refinancing-getting-it-right.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2013)
(“Refinancing your mortgage is a great way to lower your monthly payments, get a
better interest rate, or take advantage of home equity for a cash loan . . . .”).  Com-
mon loan types for refinancing a mortgage are: (1) fixed-rate, (2) adjustable-rate,
(3) interest-only, and (4) hybrid, which all may provide different advantages (or
pitfalls) to the borrower. See id.  (suggesting that prospective borrowers shop
around to find most beneficial mortgage for refinancing).
8. See generally Sunayana Mehra, MOODY’S ANALYTICS: METHODOLOGY FOR
FORECASTING FORECLOSURES 7 (2011), available at https://www.economy.com/
home/products/samples/RealtyTrac_Methodology_062011.pdf (noting that late-
stage delinquency rates and local economic conditions such as house price depre-
ciation and job loss are main drivers of foreclosures); see also Mortgages and the
Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2011), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/m/mortgages/index.html (explaining mortgage crisis of
2008).  The mortgage crisis was caused in part by the purchase of homes during
the real estate boom by many unqualified buyers who could not afford the pay-
ments as “the economy turned down and layoffs soared.” Id. (“By late 2008, as the
wheels were coming off Wall Street, some economists were estimating that 8 mil-
lion to 10 million borrowers might lose their homes because they could not afford
to repay or refinance their loans.”). See Editorial, Still No Justice for Mortgage Abuses,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/opinion/sun-
day/still-no-justice-for-mortgage-abuses.html (discussing settlement between large
banks and state and federal officials for widespread foreclosure fraud).  Nearly 3
million borrowers are in or near foreclosure. See id. (citing disproportionate num-
ber of short sales relative to principal reductions from loan modification).
9. See Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federali-
zation of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 584 (2010) (noting
high unemployment rates, rising foreclosure levels, and increased welfare rolls); see
2
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A driving force behind the mortgage crisis was the issuance of subprime
mortgages.10  These mortgages allowed people with low incomes and less-
than-stellar credit scores to purchase homes that they otherwise could not
afford.11  When housing prices declined, many of these borrowers were
left “under water,” with their homes valued at less than their mortgage
loans.12  Coupled with the overall economic downturn, many of these
homeowners were forced into foreclosure.13
also Mortgages and the Markets, supra note 8 (“Mortgages form the financial under-
pinnings of the nation’s housing market and have allowed more than two-thirds of
households to own their own homes.”).  Wide-spread refinancing would provide a
strong stimulus for the economy because it would lower borrowers’ mortgage pay-
ments immediately, allowing them to invest savings elsewhere. See id. (encourag-
ing refinancing as solution to problems in housing market).
10. See Kevin M. Baum, Note, Apparently, “No Good Deed Goes Unpunished”: The
Earmarking Doctrine, Equitable Subrogation, and Inquiry Notice Are Necessary Protections
When Refinancing Consumer Mortgages in an Uncertain Credit Market, 83 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1361, 1361 n.1 (2009) (explaining need for—and advantages of—refinancing
for Americans with subprime mortgages).  Subprime mortgages allowed individu-
als who could not qualify for traditional loans to take out mortgages to purchase
homes. See id. (reporting high default rate for subprime borrowers); see also Nel-
son, supra note 9, at 585 (explaining how subprime mortgages were integral part of
real estate bubble).  Subprime mortgages are security interests that do not meet
traditional credit standards, but were approved during the housing boom. See id.
11. See Steven Gjerstad & Vernon L. Smith, Opinion, From Bubble to Depres-
sion?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123897612802
791281.html (explaining that housing bubble began in 1997, while price decline
began in 2006).  By 2008, falling home prices left many homeowners under water,
with a house less valuable than the loan they took out to pay for it. See id. (noting
that 10.5 million households had negative equity in December 2008).
12. See Merle, supra note 3 (reporting that percentage of outstanding mort-
gages in foreclosure reached all-time high).  The default rate was particularly high
among homeowners with subprime loans. See id. (noting that forty-two percent of
homeowners had adjustable subprime loans).
13. See Stephanie Armour, 2008 Foreclosure Filings Set Record, USA TODAY (Feb.
3, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2009-01-14-
foreclosure-record-filings_N.htm (noting that home foreclosures rose eighty-one
percent in United States from 2007 to 2008).  Banks repossessed more than
850,000 properties in 2008, compared to 404,000 in 2007. See id. (“With foreclo-
sures continuing to rise and the economy in a downward spiral, it’s not surprising
you see increased foreclosures because of increased unemployment. . . .” (quoting
former Federal Deputy Housing Commissioner Ira Peppercorn)); Amy Fontinelle,
Buying A Home: Introduction, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/univer-
sity/home/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (presenting steps potential homebuyer
must take to purchase home and explaining process to acquire loan from stand-
point of both borrower and lender); see also Buying a Home, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/buying_a_home
(last visited Sept. 10, 2012) (instructing prospective home purchasers on how to
find competitive mortgages, interest rates, and home-buying programs).  This site
provides calculators to determine how large a loan a person can afford. See id.
(explaining benefits of buying versus renting); Foreclosure Statistics, NEIGHBOR
WORKS AM., http://www.fdic.gov/about/comein/files/foreclosure_statistics.pdf
(last visited Feb. 22, 2013) (providing foreclosure statistics in United States prior to
2008 and detailing problems homeowners face when dealing with foreclosure).
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When a homeowner defaults on a mortgage loan the lender has the
right to foreclose on the property.14  During the mortgage crisis, many
homeowners elected to refinance their loans to combat high monthly pay-
ments and avoid foreclosure.15  In other words, the homeowners used the
proceeds from a new loan to pay off the balance of their original loan.16
In general, homeowners look to refinance when interest rates on mort-
gage loans are low or when they need additional capital.17  Thus, home-
owners nearing foreclosure capitalized on the historically-low interest
14. See Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness
and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639,
639 (1997) (noting that real estate foreclosures are expensive and time consum-
ing, needlessly increasing costs associated with making loans).  A real estate mort-
gage is an interest in real estate, offered by a homeowner in order to secure a
specific debt. See id. at 643 (explaining that when mortgagor defaults on payment
of debt secured by mortgage, acceleration clause makes the entire indebtedness
due immediately).  Under the current foreclosure process, a mortgage holder has
a right to foreclose on the property, while the borrower typically has a period of
time to pay off debt before the lender forces the sale of the property. See id. (not-
ing two dominant forms of foreclosure in United States: (1) judicial foreclosure
sale and (2) non-judicial foreclosure sale).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. b (1997) (“A per-
son’s interest in real estate may be jeopardized by the threat of foreclosure of a
prior mortgage.”).  The Restatement recognizes that paying off a mortgage may be
the only practical way to protect a lender’s interest. See id. (recognizing impor-
tance of refinancing). See also Sang Jun Yoo, Note, A Uniform Test for the Equitable
Subrogation of Mortgages, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2129, 2136 (2011) (defining mortgage
refinancing as transaction where existing mortgage is discharged and replaced
with new mortgage).  Homeowners typically refinance when interest rates on new
mortgage loans are lower than on their existing loans or when the homeowner
needs additional capital. See id. (indicating that refinancing mortgagees only agree
to issue refinancing mortgage on condition that prior property interests are satis-
fied). See also Armour, supra note 13 (noting that homeowners are capitalizing on
falling interest rates to lower monthly mortgage payments).  Refinancing applica-
tions comprised eighty-five percent of all mortgage applications in 2008. See id.
(marking highest rates of refinancing since 2003).
16. See MICHAEL T. MADISON ET AL., 1 LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 8:3
(2012) (“‘Refinancing’ simply means the substitution of a new loan for an existing
one . . . that is more expensive.”).  The purpose is to discharge a more expensive
mortgage loan, reduce interest expenses, or extend the loan term. See id. (noting
that lien priority issues may arise in refinancing where intervening junior
lienholder asserts priority over refinance mortgage); see also Grant S. Nelson &
Dale A. Whitman, Adopting Restatement Mortgage Subrogation Principles: Saving Billions
of Dollars for Refinancing Homeowners, 2006 BYU L. REV. 305, 312 (2006) (explaining
refinancing process as applied to mortgage loans); Lucy Madison, Obama Unveils
Mortgage Refinancing Plan, CBS NEWS (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-503544_162-57369731-503544/obama-unveils-mortgage-refinancing-plan/
(revealing proposal to make it easier for Americans to refinance their mortgages);
Stiglitz & Zandi, supra note 6 (finding that refinancing would allow homeowners to
reduce monthly payments and increase money for disposable income).
17. See Yoo, supra note 15, at 2136 (explaining that homeowners typically seek
refinancing when interest rates are low or when they need additional capital).
4
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rates, allowing them to shop around for more favorable loan
agreements.18
In a refinancing transaction, the lender only agrees to pay off the
original mortgage loan “on the condition that all prior interests on [the]
property are satisfied.”19  If an undisclosed lien remains on the property
the lender may find itself in a secondary lien position.20  Lien priority is
crucial to mortgage lenders because, in the event of foreclosure, the
lienholder with the highest priority is the first to receive foreclosure pro-
ceeds.21  Therefore, lenders are reluctant to refinance loans in states
where they are not ensured that they will be the primary lienholder on the
property.22
One of the most important concepts for refinancing lenders is equita-
ble subrogation.23  This common law doctrine allows a lender who pays
18. See Rachel Louise Ensign, It’s a Good Time to Refinance, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230381290457729576
2407392928.html (reporting that interest rates are beginning to increase after
country’s mortgage crisis, so it may be time to initiate refinancing proceedings).
The article makes it clear that “[i]f you’re considering refinancing, there’s really
no point in waiting.” See id. (encouraging homeowners to refinance).  Also, the
author explains that one may choose to refinance for a shorter-term loan, thus
allowing the borrower to pay off the loan more quickly; others may choose to ex-
tend the pay off period, which would take the borrower longer to pay off, but with
lower monthly payments. See id. (noting that refinance deals vary depending on
borrower’s financial situation and location); see also Vickie Elmer, Complaints
Against Lenders, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/
realestate/mortgages-complaints-against-lenders.html (noting “fatigue and frustra-
tion” of borrowers attempting to modify or refinance their loans (citing CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2012)).
19. See Yoo, supra note 15, at 2136 (noting that refinancing lenders agree to
issue refinancing loan on condition that all prior interests are satisfied).
20. See id. (explaining that mortgage refinancers obtain title searches to iden-
tify all prior interests on property that must be satisfied).
21. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 305 n.2 (noting that priority is
“critical” to mortgage lenders).  If an intervening lien acquires priority over the
refinancing lender, there is a much higher risk that the foreclosure proceeds will
be insufficient to pay the mortgage obligation in full. See id. (recognizing possible
windfall that could be granted to intervening lienholder).
22. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Prestance Corp., 160 P.3d 17, 25 (Wash. 2007)
(en banc) (finding that lender providing funds to pay off existing mortgage ex-
pects to receive same security as loan being paid off).  Furthermore, the court
recognized that refinancing is “common place” in today’s economy. Id. (adopting
Restatement approach to equitable subrogation in context of refinancing); see also
Adam M. Starr, Moving up in a Down Market: Rediscovering Equitable Subrogation, REAL
EST. NEWSALERT (Miller Starr Regalia, Walnut Creek, Cal.), May 2009, available at
http://www.msrlegal.com/mediafiles/moving-up-in-a-down-market-rediscovering-
equitable-subrogation.pdf (noting that lenders are turning to equitable subroga-
tion to preserve and protect their real property security from intervening liens).
23. See Henry C. Winiarski Jr., Equitable Subrogation in the Context of Interests in
Real Property: The Basics and the Areas Needing Authoritative Clarification, 85 CONN. B.J.
231, 232 (2011) (explaining that equitable subrogation prevents injustice in form
of unjust enrichment).  Furthermore, courts primarily apply the doctrine to adjust
the priority of real property interests by substituting one party for another. See id.
(defining equitable subrogation as “remedy of restoration” that restores order of
5
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the obligation of another to take the lien position of the prior lender.24
States vary in their approach to equitable subrogation, ranging from re-
strictive to liberal.25  Pennsylvania’s approach is relatively conservative as
compared to other states, disallowing subrogation in most refinancing
contexts.26  For example, in First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller,27 defendant
Catharine Heller took out a loan in order to refinance the mortgages on
her property.28  Ameriquest, the refinancing lender, agreed to grant the
loan under the assumption that it would take a priority lien position on
her property.29  In reality, an intervening lien remained undisclosed, so
priorities by allowing party to assume status or priority previously enjoyed by an-
other party).  The author explains that the doctrine is used to maintain an order
of priorities that was unintentionally altered by mistake. See id. (noting that mis-
takes are often caused by attorneys or title searchers).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. b (1997) (“A per-
son’s interest in real estate may be jeopardized by the threat of foreclosure of a
prior mortgage.  Performing that mortgage obligation may be the only or most
feasible means of protecting the interest.”); see also Yoo, supra note 15, at 2131
(recognizing that equitable subrogation assigns priority rights that original credi-
tor would have held, had debt not been satisfied, to party who satisfied debt).  The
author explains that in the context of mortgage refinancing, equitable subrogation
works to resolve problems caused by undiscovered intervening liens. See id. (illus-
trating how refinancing mortgagee is provided priority rights accruing from mort-
gage or lien that was satisfied).
25. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 21 (“Courts generally consider knowledge in one
of three ways when applying equitable subrogation to a refinancing lender.”).  The
court lists the three approaches: “[1] the Restatement approach that says actual or
constructive knowledge of intervening interests is irrelevant; [2] a minority ap-
proach that says a plaintiff with either actual or constructive knowledge cannot
seek equitable subrogation; . . .” and (3) a majority approach that allows equitable
subrogation with constructive knowledge, but not with actual knowledge. See id.
(applying Restatement approach after discussing merits and drawbacks to each al-
ternative); see also John C. Murray, Equitable Subrogation: Can a Refinancing Mortgagee
Establish Priority Over Intervening Liens?, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 249, 251
(2010) [hereinafter Murray, Refinancing] (indicating that courts have adopted
three different jurisdictional approaches to equitable subrogation).  The author
notes that while many cases and commentators favor the Restatement approach, it
is still not the majority position. See id. (demonstrating benefits of Restatement
approach).
26. See generally Harris Ominsky, Mortgage Priorities: Pennsylvania Rule May Im-
pair Refinancing, REAL EST. L. REP., Oct. 2008 (discussing Pennsylvania’s approach
to equitable subrogation and how it differs from Restatement approach).  The au-
thor argues that Pennsylvania’s current approach could impair borrowers’ ability
to refinance their loans. See id. (noting that Superior Court of Pennsylvania in
1313466 Ontario, Inc. v. Carr, 954 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) suggested legislative
review); see also Laurie Fiore, Using Equitable Subrogation in Title Disputes in Penn-
sylvania, COMPLEX TITLE ISSUES, at 139 (2005) (describing elements of Penn-
sylvania approach and cases that have failed to meet each element).
27. 863 A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
28. See id. at 1154 (stating that Heller received $119,000 loan to pay off prior
loans on her property).  At this point there were still three loans encumbering the
property, but Heller only paid off two, leaving one remaining. See id. (noting that
Ameriquest’s loan was subordinate).
29. See id. (noting that public record revealed three mortgages when loan was
executed).  Ameriquest’s loan was used to pay off two loans from 1990 and 1995
6
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Ameriquest was forced to take a secondary lien position.30  By denying
Ameriquest subrogation, the court punished a lender for providing a
struggling homeowner the opportunity to refinance.31  The court held
that Ameriquest was not entitled to equitable subrogation because it was a
volunteer and did not have an interest in paying off the prior loans.32
This Note argues that the current state of Pennsylvania’s equitable
subrogation law is outdated, and urges the state, through judicial opinion
or legislation, to take a more liberal approach to such a valuable legal
doctrine.33  Part II explains the history of the doctrine and details the vary-
respectively, but First Commonwealth’s 2000 mortgage remained. See id. (finding
that First Commonwealth held primary lien position).
30. See id. (explaining that First Commonwealth’s 2000 mortgage took prior-
ity over Ameriquest’s new mortgage).  Thus, the 2000 lien took priority position on
the property when Ameriquest’s loan proceeds were used to pay off the 1990 and
1995 loans. See id. (recognizing that Ameriquest should have been aware of First
Commonwealth’s mortgage because title search would have revealed lien); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. b (1997) (stating that person’s
interest in real property is jeopardized by threat of foreclosure of priority mort-
gage).  Furthermore, paying off the prior mortgage may be the only practical way
to protect a lender’s interest. See id. (illustrating importance of equitable subroga-
tion in protecting lienholder’s interest in property); 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation
§ 58 (2012) (defining “intervening lienholder” as one that intervenes in sequence
when there has been prior, intervening lien, followed by release of prior lien, and
creation of new lien in favor of party who funded release of prior lien).  Moreover,
in order to avoid unjust enrichment in favor of the intervening lienholder, the
mortgagee is entitled to subrogation to the rights of the senior encumbrance. See
id. (demonstrating role subrogation plays in protecting refinancing lender’s
interests).
31. See Heller, 863 A.2d at 1160 (holding that Ameriquest was not entitled to
remedy of equitable subrogation).  Furthermore, court held that First Common-
wealth had every right to foreclose on the property as the priority lienholder. See
id. (noting that Ameriquest’s negligence in failing to discover intervening lien
caused it to be junior to First Commonwealth’s mortgage).  The court explained
that Ameriquest filed a petition to intervene seeking to assert its right to equitable
subrogation. See id. at 1154 (revealing that default judgment was entered against
Heller and writ of execution was granted, allowing Sheriff to foreclose on her
house).  Ameriquest filed a petition to stay the sheriff’s sale, which the court
granted, but then vacated after denying its petition to intervene. See id. at 1154–55
(holding that Ameriquest had not demonstrated prerequisites to establish remedy
of equitable subrogation).
32. See id. at 1160 (holding that Ameriquest was not entitled to equitable sub-
rogation and thus secured subordinate interest to First Commonwealth’s lien).
The court found that First Commonwealth had the undisputed right to foreclose
in priority position and that it was not necessary to protect Ameriquest’s interest.
See id. (finding that intervening in case would not be necessary to provide Ameri-
quest relief).  In addition, it found that “courts of equity will not relieve a party
from the consequences of error due to his own ignorance or carelessness when
there were available means which would have enabled him to avoid the mistake if
reasonable care had been exercised.” Id. at 1159 (quoting Home Owners’ Loan
Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330, 332 (1943)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 305–06 (explaining that making
subrogation available liberally can eliminate risk that intervening liens will take
priority over refinancing mortgages).  In recent years, many courts have adopted
the Restatement approach or followed its logic. See id. at 314 (finding that Restate-
7
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ing approaches taken by different jurisdictions in the United States.34
Part III discusses the doctrine’s development within Pennsylvania and how
the court applied it leading up to Heller.35  Part IV addresses how the Supe-
rior Court of Pennsylvania applied the doctrine in Heller and describes the
effect that this decision has on lenders, borrowers, and refinancing in gen-
eral.36  Finally, Part V looks to other states for more liberal approaches to
equitable subrogation and provides Pennsylvania with a solution to its
problematic approach.37  In order for Pennsylvania to keep up with the
current trend in courts and foster sound economic policy, it must adopt
the Restatement approach to equitable subrogation.38
II. BUILDING UP: THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION
IN PENNSYLVANIA
While other states continue to expand the doctrine of equitable sub-
rogation, Pennsylvania maintains a restrictive approach.39  In Penn-
sylvania, a lender cannot employ equitable subrogation if the lender is
considered a “mere volunteer.”40  This approach prevents the application
of the doctrine in almost all refinancing contexts and greatly restricts its
fundamental purpose.41
ment takes expansive view of applying equitable subrogation).  Furthermore, the
article urges states to adopt the Restatement approach because it is “friendly” to
first mortgage refinancing. See id. at 327–28.  Finally, the authors argue that lend-
ers and title insurers support the adoption of the Restatement approach because it
“dramatically reduces the financial risk . . . posed by intervening lien[-holders].”
See id. at 353 (noting that Restatement approach would greatly reduce need for
title insurance in refinancing).
34. For a further discussion of the history of equitable subrogation and the
different jurisdictional approaches, see infra notes 39–98 and accompanying text.
35. For a further discussion of the facts, holding, and rationale of Heller, see
infra notes 99–165 and accompanying text.
36. For a further discussion of how Pennsylvania courts have applied the doc-
trine established in Heller, see infra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.  For a
further discussion of other states’ approaches to equitable subrogation, see infra
notes 180–202 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion of why Penn-
sylvania should change its approach to equitable subrogation, see infra notes
203–25.
37. For a further discussion of the recommended alternative to Pennsylvania’s
approach see infra notes 226–33 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 226–33 (arguing that Pennsylvania should adopt Restate-
ment approach to equitable subrogation).
39. See Heller, 863 A.2d at 1153, 1158 (requiring four-part test for equitable
subrogation to apply).
40. Id. at 1158–59 (noting that claimant cannot act as volunteer).
41. See Ominsky, supra note 26 (noting that lender who extends loan to pay
off earlier loan is “volunteer” in Pennsylvania).
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss2/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-2\VLR204.txt unknown Seq: 9  8-APR-13 11:27
2013] NOTE 309
A. History of Equitable Subrogation: Background and General Approaches
Originally, equitable subrogation was only applied in the context of
sureties, however, its application expanded over time.42  The doctrine was
then adopted in the context of mortgage refinancing, where it protected
lenders from losing priority position.43  Most courts recognize that the
doctrine is based in equity and apply it in a manner that prevents unjust
enrichment and an unearned windfall.44  In the context of mortgage
loans, subrogation applies when loan proceeds from a new loan are used
to satisfy a prior lien.45  When this occurs, the new lender—i.e., refinanc-
ing lender—stands in the shoes of the prior lienholder.46  In general, the
doctrine applies when a person has assumed or satisfied the obligation of
another and thus obtains the rights, priorities, liens, and remedies of the
former obligee.47
42. See Gregg H. Mosson, Comment, Equitable Subrogation in Maryland Mort-
gages and the Restatement of Property: A Historical Analysis for Contemporary Solutions, 41
U. BALT. L. REV. 709, 715 (2012) (explaining that concept of subrogation evolved
from British common law when surety guaranteed debt, was forced to pay upon
default, and after paying, appealed to equity court to pursue repayment from de-
faulting debtor).  American equity courts first granted this right based on princi-
ples of justice, and legal courts increasingly adopted it to compel discharge of debt
by party that should pay it. See id..
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. a (1997) (“[Subro-
gation] may arise when one pays or performs in full an obligation owed by another
and secured by a mortgage.”).
44. See Note, Subrogation of Purchaser to Rights of Senior Mortgagee Against Junior
Encumbrances, 48 YALE L.J. 683, 683 (1939) [hereinafter Subrogation] (describing
subrogation as substitution of one person in place of another with reference to
lawful claim or right).  The author further states that the doctrine is purely equita-
ble and is applied when a prospective subrogee assumes or satisfies an obligation
for which another is primarily liable. See id. at 683–84 (noting equitable nature of
subrogation and importance of liberal application).
45. See John C. Murray, Equitable Subrogation: Is the Trend Toward the Restatement
Approach?, 21 PROB. & PROP. 19, 19 (Dec. 2007) [hereinafter Murray, Trend] (stat-
ing that doctrine of equitable subrogation generally provides that new lender
stands in shoes of prior lienholder when proceeds from new loan are used to sat-
isfy prior lien).  The article recognizes that equitable subrogation is designed to
prevent a windfall amounting to an unjust enrichment for the intervening
lienholder. See id. (explaining that purpose of equitable subrogation is to prevent
unjust enrichment).
46. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation § 58 (2012) (“Under the doctrine of equita-
ble subrogation, where fairness and justice require, one who advances money to
discharge a prior lien on real or personal property and takes a new mortgage as
security is entitled to be subrogated to the rights under the prior lien against the
holder of an intervening lien of which he was ignorant.”).  Equitable subrogation
serves as an exception to modern recording statutes when determining priority of
multiple mortgage interests. See id. (illustrating that equitable subrogation enables
lender to step into shoes of prior mortgagee in order to receive that mortgagee’s
priority over subsequent liens).
47. See Robert M. Smith, Note, What Happened to the Equity in Equitable Subroga-
tion?: Metmore Financial, Inc. v. Landoll Corp., 64 MO. L. REV. 503, 503 (1999)
(“The doctrine of equitable subrogation provides courts with a vehicle to allow a
lending institution that has paid off an existing loan to take the original lending
institution’s place in priority status.”).
9
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Courts recognize two types of subrogation: (1) conventional and (2)
equitable (or legal).48  Conventional subrogation requires an express or
implied agreement that one lienholder will be subrogated to the position
of another.49  On the other hand, equitable subrogation is not based on
agreement, but rather the equities of the particular case.50  Therefore, eq-
uitable subrogation has developed a complicated history in common-law,
as it is applied differently from state to state.51
Courts have adopted three different approaches to equitable subroga-
tion, reflecting different apportionments of equity: (1) the majority posi-
tion holds that a party with actual knowledge of an intervening lien cannot
seek equitable subrogation; (2) the minority position holds that a party
with actual or constructive knowledge of an intervening lien cannot seek
equitable subrogation; and (3) the Third Restatement of Property approach
states that actual or constructive knowledge of an intervening lien is irrele-
vant and does not bar application of equitable subrogation.52  Many schol-
48. See Subrogation, supra note 44, at 684 (noting distinction between conven-
tional and legal subrogation).  The author goes on to state that the boundaries of
subrogation are difficult to describe, and that the tendency is to extend the useful-
ness of the doctrine. See id. at 685 (describing different approaches to doctrine);
see also Murray, Refinancing, supra note 25, at 267 (“There are two broad categories
of subrogation rights: contractual or conventional rights, and common-law or equi-
table rights.” (quoting Aames Capital Corp v. Interstate Bank of Oak Forest, 734
N.E.2d 493, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000))).  The author explains that equitable subro-
gation is utilized to prevent unjust enrichment, while conventional subrogation
arises from agreement. See id. (explaining difference between conventional and
legal subrogation).
49. See Aames Capital Corp. v. Interstate Bank of Oak Forest, 734 N.E.2d 493,
498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (noting that conventional subrogation arises from express
or implied understanding, where one party pays debt of another and by agreement
is entitled to rights of original creditor).
50. See id. (explaining that equitable subrogation is common law doctrine
used to prevent unjust enrichment).  There is no general rule for applying equita-
ble subrogation, “since the right depends upon the equities of each particular
case.” Id. (describing different instances where doctrine applies).
51. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation § 58 (2012) (stating that decisions for equi-
table subrogation are based on equity, as courts’ goals are to avoid windfalls and
prejudice to interests of junior lienholders.); see also Bruce H. White & William L.
Medford, Equitable Subrogation: The Saving Grace for Unperfected Lenders?, 24 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 38, 38 (2005) (“Because equitable subrogation is a state law doc-
trine, it may differ from state to state or may not exist at all, and its application will
differ.”).
52. Compare Aurora Loan Servs. L.L.C. v. Senchuk, 36 So.3d 716, 724 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (applying majority approach, finding that constructive notice
did not preclude equitable subrogation), with Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v.
Roberts, 366 S.W.3d 405, 409 (Ky. 2012) (applying minority approach, holding
that constructive notice did preclude equitable subrogation), and Bank of Am.,
N.A. v. Prestance Corp., 160 P.3d 17, 29 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (applying Restate-
ment approach and finding that equitable subrogation should be applied to pre-
vent unjust enrichment). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS.
§ 7.6(a) (1997), which states in relevant part:
One who fully performs an obligation of another, secured by a mortgage,
becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the mortgage to
the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. Even though the per-
10
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ars recognize that a liberal application of equitable subrogation preserves
the equitable nature of the doctrine.53
1. Majority Approach: No Actual Knowledge
The majority position allows equitable subrogation in many cases, ex-
cept those where the lender had actual knowledge of a prior lien.54  This
formance would otherwise discharge the obligation and the mortgage,
they are preserved and the mortgage retains its priority in the hands of
the subrogee.
Id. (providing liberal approach to equitable subrogation).
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. a (1997) (“Subro-
gation is an equitable remedy designed to avoid a person’s receiving an unearned
windfall at the expense of another.”).  The doctrine of equitable subrogation rests
on the equitable maxim that a person should not be enriched by another person’s
(or lender’s) loss. See Murray, Refinancing, supra note 25, at 250–52 (noting that
trend in case law and commentary appears to be toward Restatement approach, as
it is most favorable to lenders, prevents unjust enrichment, and ensures interven-
ing lienholders do not receive windfall in form of priority lien position); Murray,
Trend, supra note 45, at 19 (explaining that doctrine is used to prevent unjust en-
richment).  Equitable subrogation is designed to prevent unjust forfeiture on one
hand and a windfall in the form of unjust enrichment on the other. See id.  (find-
ing that equity should be enforced as justice requires).
54. See, e.g., Foster v. Porter Bridge Loan Co., 27 So. 3d 481, 488 (Ala. 2009)
(holding that constructive notice will not preclude application of equitable subro-
gation); Newberry v. Scruggs, 986 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ark. 1999) (finding that equi-
table subrogation applied when judgment lien prevented refinancing mortgagee
from taking priority position); Equicredit Corp. of Conn. v. Kasper, 996 A.2d 1243,
1246 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010) (holding that equitable subrogation did not apply
because plaintiff had actual and constructive notice of defendant’s lien); E. Sav.
Bank v. Cach, L.L.C., 55 A.3d 344, 350 (Del. 2012) (denying right to apply equita-
ble subrogation); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Mendoza, 11 A.3d 229, 235 (D.C. 2010)
(“[L]ender who pays off a pre-existing mortgage and takes a new mortgage as se-
curity for the loan will be subrogated to the rights of the first mortgagee as against
any intervening lienholders, even if the lender is on constructive notice.”);
Senchuk, 36 So. 3d at 721–22 (holding that lender was entitled to equitable subro-
gation and that constructive notice did not preclude application); Chase Manhat-
tan Mortg. Corp. v. Shelton, 722 S.E.2d 743, 748 (Ga. 2012) (finding that equitable
subrogation was not available based on lenders inexcusable neglect); Beneficial
Haw., Inc. v. Kida, 30 P.3d 895, 920 (Haw. 2001) (holding that equitable subroga-
tion could not be applied because other party did not have right to foreclose);
State v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 879 P.2d 1111, 1115 (Idaho 1994) (finding that state was
not volunteer and thus was entitled to equitable subrogation); Home Owners’
Loan Corp. v. Rupe, 283 N.W. 108, 111 (Iowa 1938) (applying equitable subroga-
tion, stating that intervener was not misled or injured); United Carolina Bank v.
Beesley, 663 A.2d 574, 576 (Me. 1995) (holding that mortgagee was entitled to
equitable subrogation); G.E. Capital Mortg. Servs. v. Levenson, 657 A.2d 1170,
1179 (Md. 1995) (finding that equitable subrogation could be applied prior to
successful foreclosure sale); Grenada Bank v. Young, 104 So. 166, 168 (Miss. 1925)
(holding that appellee was not volunteer and thus entitled to subrogation); Ship-
man v. Terrill, 276 P. 21, 24 (Mont. 1929) (recognizing doctrine of equitable sub-
rogation); Am. Nat’l Bank v. Clark, 670 N.W.2d 484, 489 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003) (per
curiam) (finding that negligence on behalf of title insurer did not preclude equita-
ble subrogation claim); Chase v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 921 A.2d 369, 377 (N.H.
2007) (holding that all four elements of equitable subrogation claim were satis-
fied); Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Barnes, 623 S.E.2d 617, 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)
11
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rule holds that actual knowledge of an existing lien precludes application
of equitable subrogation, while constructive knowledge of such a lien does
not.55  Supporters of this doctrine rely on three arguments.56  First, they
contend that granting equitable subrogation liberally would contradict the
stability and predictability of the recording rule “first in time, first in
right.”57  Second, allowing subrogation with actual knowledge would per-
mit a party to knowingly achieve a higher priority position through equity
when it could not have done so otherwise.58  Third, courts suggest that a
(denying equitable subrogation because refinancing mortgagee was not compelled
to refinance loan and failed to properly search public records); ABN AMRO
Mortg. Grp. v. Kangah, 126 Ohio St.3d 425, 2010-Ohio-3779, 934 N.E.2d 924, 927
(holding that negligence and prejudice to junior lienholder precluded application
of equitable subrogation); Dimeo v. Gesik, 98 P.3d 397, 402 (Or. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that bank had reasonable basis for asserting equitable subrogation claim);
Highmark Fed. Credit Union v. Wells Fargo Fin. S.D., 2012 S.D. 38, ¶¶ 7–9, 814
N.W.2d 814, 817 (holding that equitable subrogation did not apply because bank
failed to accompany loan with written demand to satisfy mortgage as provided by
statute); Bankers Trust Co. v. Collins, 124 S.W.3d 576, 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)
(denying equitable subrogation because debt was not paid through fraud or mis-
take); Homeside Lending, Inc. v. Miller, 2001 UT App 247, ¶¶ 21–27, 31 P.3d 607,
612 (holding that without mistake or fraud, it would be inappropriate to apply
equitable subrogation); Centreville Car Care, Inc. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 559 S.E.2d
870, 874 (Va. 2002) (reversing decision awarding equitable subrogation because it
would prejudice junior lienholder); Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. First Nat’l
Bank of Steamboat Springs, N.A., 2006 WY 132, ¶¶ 20–22, 144 P.3d 1224, 1230
(declining to adopt Restatement approach to equitable subrogation).
55. See Bank of Am., N.A., 160 P.3d at 22–23 (noting that majority approach is
followed by many jurisdictions, but not all).  The court recognized that the major-
ity approach engenders belief that constructive notice should not block equitable
subrogation, but that actual knowledge of intervening liens does preclude use of
the doctrine. See id. at 22 (electing not to follow this approach); Houston v. Bank
of Am. Fed. Sav. Bank, 78 P.3d 71, 73 (Nev. 2003) (explaining that majority of
states preclude application of equitable subrogation when lienholder had actual
knowledge of existing lien); see also Melinda Margolies & Brian Margolies, Equitable
Subrogation and Negligent Title Searches: When Title Insurance Becomes Irrelevant, DRI
TODAY, http://clients.criticalimpact.com/newsletter/newslettercontentshow1.
cfm?contentid=12053&id=1375 (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) (noting that majority rule
precludes application of equitable subrogation when subsequent lienholder has
actual knowledge).
56. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 22 (noting that there are three reasons generally
given in support of majority approach to equitable subrogation).  The court goes
on to state that these reasons are unconvincing and elects to adopt the Restate-
ment approach rather than the majority rule. See id. at 23 (describing advantages
of Restatement approach). But see Countrywide Home, 144 P.3d at 1231 (holding
that interest in clarity and certainty in land title matters outweighs interest of pro-
tecting lending institutions).
57. Prestance, 160 P.3d at 22 (explaining that some believe subrogation vio-
lates “first in time” rule).  The court goes on to state that equitable subrogation
could not present much of a threat to the recording acts if jurisdictions allow an
ignorant subrogee with constructive knowledge, but not one with actual knowl-
edge. See id. at 23 (highlighting that argument for majority approach would deny
all application of doctrine).
58. See id. at 22 (noting that supporters of majority approach believe that
lender should not be allowed to knowingly “leap-frog” another lienholder’s prior-
12
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lender cannot reasonably expect to assume first priority lien position when
that lender has actual knowledge of an intervening lien with higher
priority.59
Critics of the majority approach argue that it fosters “willful igno-
rance,” and encourages potential mortgagees to refuse to conduct title
searches that may reveal intervening liens.60  In practice, the majority ap-
proach “places a premium on ignorance.”61  In addition, courts use actual
notice as an indicator of the refinancing lender’s intent to receive priority,
rather than the lender’s actual intent.62  Finally, courts rejecting the ma-
jority approach contend that it promotes inconsistent applications of the
doctrine by precluding subrogation for actual knowledge and not for con-
structive knowledge.63
2. Minority Approach: No Actual or Constructive Knowledge
The minority approach, adopted by a small number of states, requires
that the refinancing lender not have actual or constructive knowledge of
the prior lien.64  Proponents of this approach believe that mortgage lend-
ity position).  Here, the court argues that equitable subrogation maintains the
proper scheme of priorities and works to prevent injustice. See id. at 23 (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. e (1997)).
59. See id. (“[L]ender can rarely, if ever, reasonably expect to assume a first-
priority position when [it] has actual knowledge of intervening liens.”).  The court
makes clear that the ultimate goal of equitable subrogation is to prevent an inter-
vening lienholder from being unjustly enriched, not inferring on a lender’s intent
when issuing loan. See id. (discrediting majority approach). But see Equicredit, 996
A.2d at 1246 (denying equitable subrogation when defendant had actual knowl-
edge of intervening lien); Bankers Trust, 124 S.W.3d at 579 (denying equitable sub-
rogation without fraud or mistake); Homeside Lending, 2001 UT App 247, at ¶¶
21–27 (requiring mistake or fraud to apply equitable subrogation).
60. See Foster v. Porter Bridge Loan Co., 27 So. 3d 481, 486 (Ala. 2009) (“Crit-
ics of the majority view contend it fosters willful ignorance by encouraging pro-
spective mortgagees to forgo conducting title searches so that they might later
claim lack of actual knowledge.”); see also Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 315
(noting that refinancing lender can preserve right to subrogation by avoiding
knowledge); Smith, supra note 47, at 513–14 (arguing that majority approach mis-
places emphasis on actual notice instead of lender’s intent to receive priority
position).
61. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 315 (arguing that refraining
from examining title becomes rational step under this approach).
62. See Smith, supra note 47, at 513–14 (noting that inference to lender’s in-
tent is unnecessary under Restatement approach).  The Restatement provides the
lender with the opportunity to provide evidence to demonstrate actual intent. See
id. at 514 (explaining that under Restatement approach lender may prove its in-
tent to get priority).
63. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 23 (“[E]quitable subrogation cannot be said to
present too great a threat to the recording act scheme if jurisdictions are willing to
allow an ignorant subrogee with only constructive knowledge to come before a
prior recorded interest.”).
64. See Harms v. Burt, 40 P.3d 329, 332 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) (“‘[I]t is negli-
gence for a purchaser of either real or personal property to make the purchase
without ascertaining the facts shown by the records which may affect the title to be
13
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ers and other sophisticated businesses should be held to a higher standard
when determining lien position, and that they should not be rewarded for
failing to properly execute a title search.65  Nevertheless, this approach
has been widely criticized for eliminating the doctrine of equitable subro-
gation entirely and obviating its underlying purpose.66  Very few courts
continue to apply the minority rule because it precludes equitable subro-
gation in most cases, especially with regard to mortgage refinancing.67
Critics argue that the minority approach fails to serve the primary purpose
of equitable subrogation—protecting the interests of refinancing lenders
who are unintentionally subordinated to an intervening lien.68  Accord-
ingly, if an intervening lien is of record, then the refinancing lender must
have constructive notice under most states’ recording acts.69  Therefore,
the only time equitable subrogation would apply is in cases where fraud or
acquired.’” (quoting Kuhn v. Nat’l Bank of Holton, 87 P. 551, 552 (Kan. 1906)));
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Roberts, 366 S.W.3d 405, 409 (Ky. 2012) (af-
firming Wells Fargo rule, which permits actual or constructive knowledge to pre-
clude equitable subrogation); Wells Fargo Bank v. Commonwealth, 345 S.W.3d
800, 810 (Ky. 2011) (holding that equitable subrogation should not be granted to
lender that had constructive notice of intervening lien).  The Kansas Court of Ap-
peals held in Harms that, absent fraudulent conduct, a lender is presumed to have
knowledge of all facts that the records disclose. See Harms, 40 P.3d at 332 (advocat-
ing minority approach).
The Missouri Supreme Court described equitable subrogation as a “fairly dras-
tic remedy . . . allowed only in extreme cases ‘bordering on if not reaching the
level of fraud.’”  Ethridge v. TierOne Bank, 226 S.W.3d 127, 134 (Mo. 2007) (en
banc) (quoting Thompson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 90 S.W.3d 194, 206
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002)).
65. See Wells Fargo, 345 S.W.3d at 807 (holding that professional mortgage
lenders should be held to higher standard for purposes of determining whether
lender acted under justifiable or excusable mistake when improperly investigating
prior liens).
66. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 21–22 (“For practical purposes, this rule swallows
the doctrine and is widely criticized.”); see also Wells Fargo, 345 S.W.3d at 807 (not-
ing that critics have seen approach as “obviating the doctrine completely”); Nelson
& Whitman, supra note 16, at 315–16 (“We have vigorously criticized this approach
and find it impossible to understand in light of the fact that subrogation in this
situation harms no one, leaving the intervening lien exactly where it started.”
(footnote omitted)).
67. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 21 (“‘If all persons who negligently confer an
economic benefit upon another are disqualified from equitable relief because of
their negligence, then the law of restitution, which was conceived in order to pre-
vent unjust enrichment, would be of little or no value.’” (quoting Ex parte Am-
South Mortg. Co., 679 So. 2d 251, 255 (Ala. 1996))). But see Roberts, 366 S.W.3d at
409 (denying equitable subrogation based on constructive notice); Mill Creek
Lumber & Supply Co. v. First United Bank & Trust Co, 2012 OK CIV APP 53, ¶¶
16–20, 278 P.3d 12, 16 (holding that constructive notice precluded equitable
subrogation).
68. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 22 (“This rule renders equitable subrogation
nearly useless since a refinancing mortgagee will almost always have either actual
or constructive knowledge of junior lienholders.”).
69. See id. (noting that equitable subrogation has little use when there are no
junior lienholders because plaintiff is only party with interest in property, in which
case lender’s priority is immaterial).
14
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deceit is present.70  This is an extremely narrow application of an impor-
tant equitable doctrine.71  For this reason, most jurisdictions have stopped
using this approach.72
3. Third Restatement Approach: “To the Extent Necessary to Prevent Unjust
Enrichment”73
A number of states that apply equitable subrogation in a more liberal
manner have adopted the Third Restatement approach or a near
equivalent.74  The Restatement instructs that “[o]ne who fully performs an
70. See id. (concluding that under minority approach, equitable subrogation
is only applicable when mortgagor fraudulently hides junior interest).
71. See id. (noting that cases in which mortgagor fraudulently hides junior
lien interest are extremely rare).
72. But see Roberts, 366 S.W.3d at 409 (noting majority approach, but following
rule established in Wells Fargo); Wells Fargo Bank v. Commonwealth, 345 S.W.3d 800,
810 (Ky. 2011) (applying minority approach); Mill Creek Lumber, 278 P.3d at 16
(following minority approach).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6(a) (1997).
74. See, e.g., Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Norcutt, 274 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Ariz. 2012) (en
banc) (adopting Third Restatement approach to equitable subrogation because it
is most consistent with rationale of doctrine); Bank of N.Y. v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d
644, 653–54 (Ind. 2005) (adopting Restatement approach in context of conven-
tional refinancing and finding that actual or constructive knowledge did not bar
equitable subrogation); Fin. Ctr. Fed. Credit Union v. Brand, 967 N.E.2d 1080,
1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (following precedent established in Nally and holding
that refinancing lender can be subrogated unless culpably negligent); E. Boston
Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Mass. 1998) (applying Restatement ap-
proach, which grants equitable subrogation “to the extent necessary to prevent
unjust enrichment”); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 813
N.W.2d 332, 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that case law in Michigan was
consistent with Restatement approach with regard to refinancing); Houston v.
Bank of Am. Fed. Sav. Bank, 78 P.3d 71, 74 (Nev. 2003) (adopting Restatement
approach, finding it most persuasive out of all three approaches to equitable sub-
rogation); Prestance, 160 P.3d at 29 (adopting Restatement approach in context of
conventional refinancing, holding that equitable subrogation applied regardless of
actual or constructive knowledge); see also Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Feldsher, 49
Cal. Rptr. 2d 542, 550 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that actual knowledge does not
automatically preclude subrogation, but inexcusable negligence prejudiced inter-
vening lienholder); Land Title Ins. Corp. v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 207 P.3d 141,
145 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (citing Restatement approach, noting that neither ac-
tual nor constructive notice is dispositive in equitable subrogation analysis, but that
prejudice does preclude its application); United Cmty. Bank v. Prairie State Bank
& Trust, 972 N.E.2d 324, 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (holding that omission of encum-
brance from exceptions in title insurance policy did not defeat title insurer’s right
to equitable subrogation); Lasalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. White, 246 S.W.3d 616, 619
(Tex. 2007) (noting that equitable subrogation protects homestead property, and
without it, lenders would be hesitant to refinance homestead property); Wachovia
Mortg. FSB v. Dallas, 2011 WI App 54, ¶¶ 6–8, 332 Wis. 2d 426, 429–31, 797
N.W.2d 930, 932 (granting equitable subrogation so as to prevent unjust
enrichment).
 Some courts have not adopted the Restatement approach entirely, but apply
a method that balances the equities and seeks to prevent unjust enrichment. See,
e.g., Rush v. Alaska Mortg. Grp., 937 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1997) (applying “unjust
enrichment” standard and noting that actual knowledge was not dispositive in eq-
15
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obligation of another, secured by a mortgage, becomes by subrogation the
owner of the obligation and the mortgage to the extent necessary to pre-
vent unjust enrichment.”75  Further, the Restatement provides specific ex-
amples of where subrogation is appropriate in the context of mortgage
refinancing: (1) in order to protect interest in property; (2) under legal
duty; (3) because of misrepresentation, mistake, duress, undue influence,
deceit, or other imposition; or (4) upon the request of the obligor.76  The
Restatement specifically provides a diverse range of circumstances where
subrogation is available in order to prevent unjust enrichment and en-
courage application of the doctrine.77  Moreover, the Restatement does
not allow actual or constructive knowledge to preclude the application of
equitable subrogation.78  Rather, it permits the doctrine to apply as justice
requires, allowing it to serve its equitable purpose.79  The drafters of the
Third Restatement note that in most cases equitable subrogation prevents
an unwarranted and unjust windfall, and should therefore be applied
broadly.80
B. Pennsylvania’s Application of the Equitable Subrogation Doctrine
Pennsylvania courts have consistently recognized the doctrine of equi-
table subrogation, but have applied it in a relatively conservative man-
uitable subrogation matter).  The Rush court applied a two-part test for equitable
subrogation: “(1) whether there was an intent to subordinate the new deed of trust
and (2) whether paramount equities favor the junior creditor.” See id. at 651.
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6(a) (1997) (noting that dis-
charge of obligation would also discharge mortgage, but that lien position is pre-
served in hands of subrogee).
76. See id. § 7.6(b) (illustrating different circumstances where subrogation is
appropriate to prevent unjust enrichment).
77. See id. § 7.6 cmt. a (noting that equitable subrogation is designed to avoid
person receiving unearned windfall at expense of another).
78. See id. § 7.6 cmt. e (“Under this Restatement, however, subrogation can be
granted even if the payor had actual knowledge of the intervening interest; the
payor’s notice, actual or constructive, is not necessarily relevant.”).
79. See id. (finding that question under Restatement does not look to notice,
but instead whether payor reasonably expected to get security with priority equal
to mortgage being paid).
80. See id. § 7.6 cmt. a (concluding that intervening lienholders are not
prejudiced by subrogation because they are no worse off than before senior obliga-
tion was discharged).  Furthermore, the drafters explain that without subrogation
the junior interest would be promoted undeservedly, giving them an “unwarranted
and unjust windfall.” See id. (justifying broad application of equitable
subrogation).
16
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ner.81  In Campbell v. Foster Home Ass’n,82 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania established the state’s approach to equitable subrogation.83
There, the defendant paid off a prior mortgage for $6,000 with the pro-
ceeds of another mortgage loan.84  Nevertheless, the court found that the
defendant was acting as a volunteer because he had no interest in the
property, and the plaintiff had no knowledge of the debt being paid off.85
Furthermore, the court noted that the payment was not made under com-
pulsion, and if subrogation was granted it would exist in every case of “offi-
cious payment of the debt of another.”86  Since Campbell, Pennsylvania
courts have consistently denied equitable subrogation based on the so-
called “volunteer doctrine.”87  While other states have moved away from
81. See, e.g., In re Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 93 A. 766, 768–69
(Pa. 1915) (holding that doctrine of equitable subrogation did not apply in favor
of mere volunteer, when no contract existed between parties); Campbell v. Foster
Home Ass’n, 30 A. 222, 224–25 (Pa. 1894) (finding that payment of prior mort-
gage was act of volunteer, and thus equitable subrogation was unavailable); Appeal
of Forest Oil Co., 12 A. 442, 443–44 (Pa. 1888) (refusing petition for subrogation
as petitioner brought claim late and did not allege sufficient facts); 1313466 Onta-
rio, Inc. v. Carr, 954 A.2d 1, 4–5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (finding that Heller and Home
Owners’ are still binding precedent, and that party seeking intervention was volun-
teer under Pennsylvania’s equitable subrogation doctrine); Home Owners’ Loan
Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330, 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943) (holding that plaintiff was
stranger to defendant and voluntary agent with no interest in property); see also
Fiore, supra note 26, at 139 (summarizing equitable subrogation approach applied
in Pennsylvania).
82. 30 A. 222 (Pa. 1894).
83. See id. at 224 (holding that subrogation was not available because payment
of prior mortgage was act of mere volunteer).  The court went on to state that
“[w]hile subrogation is founded on principles of equity and benevolence . . . it will
not be decreed in favor of a mere volunteer, who, without any duty, moral or
otherwise, pays the debt of another.” Id. at 225 (noting that equitable subrogation
“will not arise in favor of a stranger, but only in favor of a party who, on some sort
of compulsion, discharges a demand against a common debtor”).
84. See id. at 224 (explaining that issue was whether equitable subrogation
applied in favor of appellant).
85. See id. at 225 (holding that payment of $6,000 was not made under com-
pulsion or protection of any rights or interests previously acquired).  The court
found that the defendant loaned money to remove a prior lien and paid off that
lien without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff. See id. (“[O]ne who is only a
volunteer cannot invoke the aid of subrogation, for such a person can establish no
equity.”).  Finally, the court stated that for a person not to qualify as a “volunteer,”
that person must have paid upon request, or as surety, or under some compulsion
that required protection of a personal right. See id. (affirming volunteer prong).
86. Id. (“[O]ne who discharges an incumbrance [sic] upon property which he
has no interest in having relieved is not thereby subrogated to the rights of the
holder of the incumbrance [sic], and the loaning of money to discharge a lien
does not subrogate the lender to the rights of the lien holder.”).
87. See, e.g., 1313466 Ontario, Inc. v. Carr, 954 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)
(discussing volunteer rule); First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153,
1159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (“One who is under no legal obligation or liability to
pay a debt and who has no interest in, or relation to, the property is a stranger or
volunteer with reference to the subject of subrogation.” (quoting Home Owners’
Loan Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330, 331 (1943))).
17
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this approach, Pennsylvania remains on the more conservative end of the
equitable subrogation spectrum.88  Pennsylvania maintains a four-part ap-
proach, requiring that: “(1) the claimant paid the creditor to protect his
own interest; (2) the claimant did not act as volunteer; (3) the claimant
was not primarily liable for the debt; and (4) allowing subrogation will not
cause injustice to the rights of others.”89  Under Pennsylvania recording
law, the mortgage recorded first holds priority and thus will recover pro-
ceeds first upon foreclosure.90
Subsequent case law in Pennsylvania has enforced the equitable sub-
rogation standard and preserved the four-part test.91  After Campbell, the
Superior Court further clarified the volunteer rule in Home Owners’ Loan
Corp. v. Crouse,92 holding that there was no right to assert equitable subro-
gation to a lender with no legal obligation or interest in the property.93  In
Home Owners’, a husband and wife took out a loan to pay off all prior en-
cumbrances on their home, but failed to pay off a judgment lien.94  While
88. Compare Carr, 954 A.2d at 4 (denying equitable subrogation because of
volunteer rule), with Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Norcutt, 274 P.3d 1204, 1208 (Ariz. 2012)
(holding that doctrine of equitable subrogation should not turn on whether
lender is volunteer).
89. See Heller, 863 A.2d at 1158 (holding that refinancing lender was volunteer
who could not adopt primary position); see also Tudor Development Grp., Inc. v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that bank that
satisfied its own primary liability rather than that of another could not invoke doc-
trine of equitable subrogation).
90. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8141(1) (West 1978) (defining “purchase
money mortgage” as mortgage taken to secure payment of all or part of purchase
price); Pennsylvania is a race notice jurisdiction with regard to recording statutes,
which means that purchase money mortgages have priority “from the time they are
delivered to the mortgagee, if they are recorded within ten days after their date;
otherwise, from the time they are left for record.” Id.; see also 21 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 622 (West 1927) (“[A]ll mortgages, or defeasible deeds in the nature of
mortgages . . . shall have priority according to the date of recording”).
91. Compare Campbell v. Foster Home Ass’n, 30 A. 222, 225 (Pa. 1894) (hold-
ing that second position lienholder, that paid off first position lien, was mere vol-
unteer in making such payment, and not entitled to subrogation), with Home
Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330, 331 (Pa. Super. 1943) (“One who is
under no legal obligation or liability to pay a debt and who has no interest in, or
relation to, the property is a stranger or volunteer with reference to the subject of
subrogation.”).
92. 30 A.2d 330 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943).
93. See id. at 331 (“A mere volunteer or intermeddler who, having no interest
to protect, without any legal or moral obligation to pay, and without an agreement
for subrogation, or an assignment of the debt, pays the debt of another is not
entitled to subrogation . . . .”).  The Home Owners’ court noted that the payor must
have acted out of “compulsion,” which only occurs when the lienholder is forced
to pay in order to protect his or her interests. See id.
94. See id. (noting that couple intended to pay liens against their home with
loan from Home Owners’, but failed to recognize one outstanding judgment lien).
The court explained that Home Owners’ had no knowledge of the intervening lien
and assumed that it would have priority lien position on the property. See id. (dis-
cussing Home Owners’ request to intervening lienholder to subordinate its lien,
but intervening lienholder refused to do so).
18
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the homeowners disclosed all other liens, they failed to disclose the judg-
ment lien, which put the lender in a secondary lien position.95  The court
held that the refinancing lender could not subrogate to the position of the
intervening lienholder because it was not required to pay the prior
debts.96  Furthermore, the court found that granting subrogation in favor
of Home Owners’ would prejudice the intervening lienholder.97  Ulti-
mately, the court recognized that the majority of Pennsylvania’s sister
states did not apply this standard, but stood by its reasoning that the
lender was a volunteer.98
III. FIRST COMMONWEALTH BANK V. HELLER: PENNSYLVANIA REFUSES TO
PUT EQUITABLE SUBROGATION FIRST
The Superior Court’s decision in Heller reaffirmed the equitable sub-
rogation precedent in Pennsylvania.99  The court continued to apply the
antiquated volunteer rule, thus precluding the application of the doctrine
in the refinancing context.100  This decision will have dramatic effects on
both homeowners and lenders as the housing market begins to
rebound.101
95. See id. at 331 (noting that homeowners set forth all liens that encumbered
property, but made no reference to outstanding judgment lien for $682.50, leaving
lender unaware).  The court recognized that the lender was likely without knowl-
edge of the judgment lien, but the intervening lienholder refused to subordinate
its loan. See id. (finding that Home Owners’ loan was subordinate).
96. See id. at 332 (holding that Home Owners’ was stranger to borrowers that
had no legal obligation or compulsion to pay borrowers’ debts).  Therefore, the
refinancing lender was a voluntary agent with no interest in the property, and it
could agree or refuse to make the loan as it pleased. See id.
97. See id. (stating that Home Owners’ negligence in failing to adequately
search public records caused them to be unaware of intervening lien).  In addi-
tion, the court held that “courts of equity will not relieve a party from the conse-
quences of an error due to his own ignorance or carelessness when there were
available means which would have enabled him to avoid the mistake if reasonable
care had been exercised.” Id. (denying equitable subrogation).
98. See id. (“Subrogation, being of equitable origin and nature, may be re-
sorted to only when one has an equity to invoke which does not injure an innocent
party.”).  The court found that Home Owners’ subrogation would unjustly
prejudice the intervening lienholder, and thus would injure an innocent party. See
id.
99. See id. (applying four-part test for equitable subrogation and holding that
equitable subrogation did not apply to refinancing mortgagee).
100. See id. (finding that refinancing mortgagee was volunteer).
101. See Stiglitz & Zandi, supra note 6 (noting that mass refinancing would
allow homeowners to drastically reduce their monthly payments and significantly
reduce chance of default).
19
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A. Facts and Procedure: A Difficult Situation for All Parties Involved
In Heller, defendant Catharine Heller, like many homeowners, sought
to refinance multiple mortgages on her home.102  When purchasing her
home in 1990, Heller took out a loan from Central Bank, which she se-
cured with a mortgage.103  In addition, Heller obtained a line of credit
from Mid-State Bank in the amount of $15,000.104  Next, Heller received a
large loan from First Commonwealth Bank.105  In 2000, First Common-
wealth granted Heller a loan to refinance her prior loan.106  Shortly after,
Heller received a loan from Ameriquest for $119,000.107  Heller used the
Ameriquest loan to pay off the Central Bank loan and the Mid-State line of
credit.108  Nevertheless, the $15,000 line of credit remained open, and
Heller never paid off the remaining First Commonwealth loan.109  At the
time Ameriquest extended its loan to Heller, three mortgages encumber-
ing the property were on public record.110  However, due to a faulty title
search, Ameriquest failed to uncover First Commonwealth’s mortgage.111
102. See Heller, 863 A.2d at 1154 (explaining that Heller received three loans
and one line of credit, which were all secured by mortgage on real property titled
in her name).
103. See id. (explaining that Central Bank, predecessor to plaintiff, extended
loan to Heller for $73,170, which she secured with mortgage on her home).
104. See id. (noting that Mid-State Bank extended $15,000 line of credit in
February 1995).
105. See id. (noting that in March 1990, Central Bank, predecessor to First
Commonwealth, extended loan in amount of $73,170 to Heller).  Also, Heller
opened up a line of credit in 1995 from Mid-State Bank. See id.
106. See id. (explaining that Heller received loan from First Commonwealth
in 2000 for $76,680.26, which she used to pay off her 1997 loan).  The 1997 loan
was also from First Commonwealth. See id.
107. See id. (detailing Ameriquest’s August 2001 loan for amount of $119,000,
which Heller used to pay off Central Bank’s 1990 loan, and Mid-State’s 1995 line of
credit).
108. See id. (acknowledging that proceeds of 2001 loan were used to pay off
Central Bank’s 1990 loan and Mid-State’s 1995 line of credit, but the latter re-
mained open).
109. See id. (noting that public records would have revealed three mortgages
on property at time of loan). Further, the court explained that the mortgage secur-
ing the 1995 line of credit remained open, thus, the mortgage remained of record.
See id.  Further, a title search executed at the time the 2001 loan was issued would
have revealed all three loans encumbering the property. See id. (referring to 1990,
1995, and 2000 mortgages).
110. See id. (noting that in August 2001, when Ameriquest extended $119,000
loan, public records would have revealed three mortgages on Heller’s property).
Specifically, Ameriquest could have determined that the (1) Central Bank 1990
Mortgage, (2) Mid-State 1995 Mortgage, and (3) First Commonwealth’s 2000
Mortgage were all encumbering the property. See id.
111. See id. (explaining that Ameriquest recognizes three mortgages existed at
time of loan, but admits that title search did not reveal existence of First Common-
wealth’s 2000 mortgage).  The court also noted that the Mid-State line of credit
remained open and First Commonwealth’s loan was unsatisfied, so Ameriquest’s
2001 Mortgage was now in third position for recovery in foreclosure. See id.
20
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Accordingly, First Commonwealth’s loan and Mid-State’s line of credit re-
mained on the property, while Ameriquest’s lien fell to third position.112
In 2003, Heller defaulted on her First Commonwealth loan, and the
bank initiated a foreclosure action against her.113  In order to preserve its
interest in Heller’s property, Ameriquest filed a petition to intervene.114
Ameriquest sought relief under the theory of equitable subrogation, argu-
ing that it should have taken the lien position of the Central Bank loan.115
Nevertheless, the court denied this petition, holding that Ameriquest’s
negligence caused its failure to uncover First Commonwealth’s mort-
gage.116  Ameriquest appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania,
which affirmed the trial court’s decision.117  The court held that Ameri-
quest was a volunteer to the transaction, and it had no obligation to pay
Heller’s prior loans.118  Therefore, Ameriquest could not be subrogated
to Central Bank’s lien position; rather, it was relegated to third lien posi-
tion.119  Thus, Ameriquest, which rightfully expected to take a priority lien
position, was now unjustly made a junior lien.120
B. The Superior Court’s Decision in Heller: Following Precedent to Nowhere
The court in Heller noted that the priority of a lien is generally deter-
mined by the date it was recorded, but that equitable subrogation is a
“widely-recognized exception to the ‘first in time’ rule.”121  The court re-
112. See id. at 1154 (recognizing two mortgages of record that encumbered
property prior to Ameriquest’s 2001 refinancing loan).  The trial court asserted
that Ameriquest’s loss of priority resulted from its own negligence in failing to
discover First Commonwealth’s mortgage. See id.
113. See id. (“On March 5, 2003, First Commonwealth Bank filed the instant
foreclosure action based upon its April 2000 loan.”).  While the actual action is
between First Commonwealth and Heller, Ameriquest unsuccessfully attempted to
file a petition to intervene as an interested party. See id.
114. See id. (acknowledging that appellant Ameriquest filed petition to inter-
vene on June 10, 2003, two months after First Commonwealth had filed its foreclo-
sure action).  After Ameriquest’s petition was denied and summary judgment
entered against Heller, the court issued a writ of execution to foreclose on Heller’s
home. See id.  The trial court granted a stay on the sheriff’s sale, but after holding
a hearing on Ameriquest’s petition, the court denied petition and vacated the stay.
See id.  Finally, the trial court entered an opinion explaining that Ameriquest did
not have the right to equitable subrogation because negligence caused it to be in
the secondary lien position. See id. at 1155.
115. See id. (noting appellant’s petition to intervene).
116. See id. (explaining that trial court held appellant’s negligence resulted in
failing to discover First Commonwealth’s mortgage).
117. See id. at 1160 (denying Ameriquest’s petition to intervene).
118. See id. (holding that Ameriquest was not entitled to equitable subroga-
tion and was therefore subordinate to First Commonwealth’s mortgage).
119. See id. at 1155 (describing trial court’s decision to deny equitable
subrogation).
120. See id. at 1154 (illustrating that three mortgages remained on Heller’s
property, two of which held priority to Ameriquest’s mortgage).
121. Id. at 1156 (noting that doctrine of equitable subrogation is recognized
in Pennsylvania as an exception to the Pennsylvania recording act).
21
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lied heavily on the precedent established in Home Owners’, where the court
found that the refinancing lender was a volunteer because it was a stranger
to the borrower and had no legal obligation to pay the borrower’s
debts.122  In addition, the court in Home Owners’ held that “courts of equity
will not relieve a party from the consequences of an error due to his own
ignorance or carelessness.”123  The court in Heller held that the facts were
“practically indistinguishable” from those presented in Home Owners’.124
In Heller, the court applied the four-part test that is well-established in
Pennsylvania.125  Of the four criteria, the court focused particularly on
whether Ameriquest was acting as a volunteer when refinancing Heller’s
loans.126  The court noted that courts should be inclined to “favor and
further” equitable subrogation, but that it requires more than “mere pay-
ment of a debt” to entitle a person to subrogation.127  Following the prece-
dent established in Home Owners’, the court affirmed that “[a] mere
volunteer or intermeddler who, having no interest to protect, without any
legal or moral obligation to pay” is not entitled to equitable subroga-
tion.128  Furthermore, the court quoted Home Owners’ stating that “[o]ne
122. See id. at 1159 (holding that refinancing mortgagee was not entitled to
equitable subrogation because it was volunteer) (quoting Home Owners’ Loan
Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330, 331 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943)).  In Home Owners’, the
court held that it “requires something more than the mere payment of a debt in
order to entitle the person paying the same to be substituted in place of the origi-
nal creditor.” Id. (denying equitable subrogation).
123. Home Owners’, 30 A.2d at 332 (noting that Home Owners’ negligence in
failing to properly search public records caused unawareness of intervening judg-
ment lien).
124. Heller, 30 A.2d at 1160 (“The trial court therefore properly found [that
Ameriquest] was not entitled to the remedy of equitable subrogation.”).  In Home
Owners’, a creditor paid various earlier liens on the homeowner’s property, but was
unaware of an intervening judgment lien. Home Owners’, 30 A.2d at 331.  The cred-
itor requested subordination, but the lienholder refused. See id.  After analogizing
the facts of Home Owners’ to the case before the court, it found that the creditor was
a mere volunteer and, as such, was not entitled to subrogation. See Heller, 30 A.2d
at 1158–59 (citing Home Owners’, 30 A.2d at 331).
125. See Heller, 30 A.2d at 1158 (explaining four criteria that must be satisfied
for equitable subrogation to apply).  Pennsylvania establishes four requirements
for claim of equitable subrogation: “(1) the claimant paid the creditor to protect
his own interests; (2) the claimant did not act as volunteer; (3) the claimant was
not primarily liable for the debt; and (4) allowing subrogation will not cause injus-
tice to the rights of others.” Id.
126. See id. (holding that under Pennsylvania law, appellant did not meet four
criteria for equitable subrogation).
127. Id. at 1159 (quoting Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330,
331 (1943)) (explaining that to be entitled to equitable subrogation, party’s equity
should be strong and superior to opposing party).
128. Id. (quoting Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330, 331
(1943)) (explaining limited circumstances in which person paying debt of another
is entitled to subrogation under Pennsylvania law).  The court explained:
The payor must have acted on compulsion, and it is only in cases where
the person paying the debt of another will be liable in the event of a
default or is compelled to pay in order to protect his own interests, or by
virtue of legal process, that equity substitutes him in the place of the cred-
22
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who is under no legal obligation or liability to pay a debt and who has no
interest in, or relation to, the property is a stranger or volunteer with refer-
ence to the subject of subrogation.”129  Finally, the court found that grant-
ing subrogation would prejudice the rights of the intervening
lienholder.130
The outcome in Heller was the product of overreliance on antiquated
precedent.131  In Heller, the court found that Ameriquest did not have an
independent interest in Heller’s property and was not compelled to satisfy
her mortgages.132  Furthermore, it held that Ameriquest was not entitled
to equitable subrogation and held a subordinate lien position to First
Commonwealth.133  Nevertheless, the court recognized that the decision
in Home Owners’, and thus this decision, was “not in accord with the Re-
statement or with the case law of many of our sister states.”134
C. Critical Analysis: The Court in Heller Defeats Purpose of
Equitable Subrogation
The court in Heller maintained Pennsylvania’s tradition of restrictive
application of equitable subrogation.135  First, the court reestablished the
overly burdensome volunteer rule, finding that one seeking equitable sub-
rogation must not be a volunteer.136  Second, it failed to address actual or
itor without any agreement to that effect; in other cases the debt is abso-
lutely extinguished.
Id. (quoting Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330, 331 (1943)).
129. Id. (noting that lender was “an entirely voluntary agent with no interest
in the property and at liberty to make its own bargain-agree or refuse to make its
loan as it saw fit.” (quoting Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330, 332
(1943))).  Further, the court found that subrogation would prejudice the rights of
the intervening lienholder and that the lender’s negligence ultimately caused the
loss of priority. See id.
130. See id. (holding that courts of equity will not relieve party from errors
caused by its own ignorance or carelessness).  The court noted that reasonable
care would have allowed Home Owners’ to avoid the mistake. See id. (explaining
that negligence caused lender to fail to discover intervening lien).
131. See Heller, 863 A.2d at 1159 (noting that court in Home Owners’, decided
over sixty years earlier, applied principles of equity and fairness and denied credi-
tor equitable subrogation).
132. See id. at 1159–60 (noting that lender in Home Owners’ was under no legal
obligation or compulsion to pay homeowner’s debts).
133. See id. at 1160 (holding that appellant was not entitled to equitable sub-
rogation, and that its lien was subordinate to that of appellee).
134. Id. at 1159–60 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (noting that Home
Owners’ was not overruled and remains binding precedent).  Furthermore, the
court found that the facts were practically indistinguishable from Home Owners’. See
id.
135. See id. at 1160 (denying equitable subrogation to refinancing lender).
136. See id. (holding that refinancing lender was volunteer).
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constructive notice.137  Third, the court applied a negligence standard
that limits the fundamental purpose of the doctrine.138
1. Pennsylvania’s Precedent Puts Refinancing Lenders Last
While the court in Heller followed the precedent established in Home
Owners’, its approach defeats the purpose of equitable subrogation.139
The volunteer rule that Pennsylvania applies is inoperably strict.140  More-
over, the rule greatly increases the risk of harm that refinancing lenders
face when issuing a loan to pay off a prior mortgage.141  In Heller, the
court found that Ameriquest was a volunteer.142  Such a holding prevents
refinancing lenders from asserting a right of equitable subrogation in
Pennsylvania.143  For this reason, many courts outside of Pennsylvania in-
terpret the volunteer rule liberally or have eliminated it altogether.144
The Restatement eliminates the volunteer rule, recognizing that it is
“highly variable and uncertain,” and causes “considerable confusion.”145
When strictly applied, the volunteer rule places the entire burden on refi-
nancing lenders.146  Noting the importance of equitable subrogation in
the context of refinancing, it seems counterintuitive to prevent refinanc-
ing lenders from taking advantage of such a valuable doctrine.147
137. See id. at 1154 (noting that Ameriquest was unaware of prior lien).
138. See id. at 1155 (disfavoring equitable subrogation because mistake re-
sulted from appellant’s negligence).
139. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW,
PRACTITIONER SERIES § 10.4 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing and disparaging volunteer
rule); see also Subrogation, supra note 44, at 684–85 (noting that in legal subrogation
class of persons included within term “volunteer” has been reduced).
140. See Winiarski, supra note 23, at 236 (arguing that voluntary actor and
volunteer are not synonymous).  In Connecticut “one may act voluntarily without
being deemed a ‘volunteer.’” Id.
141. See Mosson, supra note 42, at 721 (explaining that some courts define
volunteer like gift givers, while others exclude voluntary commercial actors).
142. See Heller, 863 A.2d at 1160 (denying equitable subrogation to refinanc-
ing lender).
143. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. b (1997) (noting
that Restatement does not adopt “volunteer” rule, but rather requires that subro-
gee “pay to protect some interest”).
144. See Mosson, supra note 42, at 721 (finding that many courts define
“‘mere volunteers’ more widely, thus excluding voluntary commercial actors, like
refinancers with no stake in prior loans”); see also Subrogation, supra note 44, at 686
(finding that there is no general agreement for definition of volunteer, but minor-
ity of courts define it as one “who did not have some previous interest to protect”).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. b (1997) (noting
that prior case law has indicated that “volunteer” is not entitled to subrogation, but
refusing to adopt this requirement).  The Restatement only requires that subrogee
pay to protect an interest, which eliminates the volunteer rule. See id.
146. See Subrogation, supra note 44, at 686 (“A minority of courts is prone to
call everyone a volunteer who was not in the position of a surety or who did not
have some previous interest to protect in the subject matter in question.”).
147. See Yoo, supra note 15, at 2136 (“Homeowners typically seek to refinance
when interest rates on new mortgages are lower than interests rates on existing
mortgage loans, or when they are in need of additional capital.”).
24
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2. Court Promotes the Volunteer Rule, But Fails to Address Actual or
Constructive Notice
Although the court in Heller did not explicitly address actual or con-
structive knowledge within the opinion, it indicated that Ameriquest’s title
search did not reveal the existence of First Commonwealth’s mortgage.148
Assuming that this is true, as the court did, Ameriquest did not have actual
knowledge of the intervening lien.149  Ameriquest did have constructive
notice because First Commonwealth properly recorded its mortgage.150
Nevertheless, the majority approach does not preclude equitable subroga-
tion for constructive notice, so this would not be determinative in Penn-
sylvania.151  Interestingly, the court in Heller did not analyze Ameriquest’s
knowledge of the prior lien, which is the focal point in most jurisdic-
tions.152  Instead, the court placed enormous significance on the volun-
teer rule, which makes the doctrine’s application in the refinancing
context much more difficult.153  In contrast to Pennsylvania’s standard,
many jurisdictions allow a request from a homeowner to constitute an in-
terest in the property.154  Thus, in those jurisdictions, refinancing lenders
are not considered strangers when the borrower seeks to refinance.155  By
148. See First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153, 1154 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004) (noting that appellant admitted title search did not reveal intervening
lien).
149. See id. (explaining that Ameriquest conceded existence of three mort-
gages, but presumed that failure to find First Commonwealth lien was due to
searcher’s error).
150. See id. (finding that three mortgages remained of record when Ameri-
quest refinanced Heller’s loan).
151. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Prestance Corp., 160 P.3d 17, 21 (Wash. 2007)
(en banc) (noting that constructive notice only plays part in minority approach to
equitable subrogation).
152. See, e.g., Foster v. Porter Bridge Loan Co., 27 So. 3d 481, 485–86 (Ala.
2009) (holding that constructive notice will not preclude application of equitable
subrogation); Equicredit Corp. of Conn. v. Kasper, 996 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2010) (holding that equitable subrogation did not apply because plaintiff
had actual or constructive notice of defendant’s lien); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v.
Mendoza, 11 A.3d 229, 235 (D.C. 2010) (“[A] lender who pays off a pre-existing
mortgage and takes a new mortgage as security for the loan will be subrogated to
the rights of the first mortgagee as against any intervening lienholders, even if the
lender is on constructive notice of the existence of the junior liens.”).
153. See Heller 863 A.2d at 1158–60 (describing volunteer rule and holding
that Ameriquest constituted volunteer under Pennsylvania law).
154. See Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 193 A. 769, 772
(Conn. 1937) (holding that mortgagee was not volunteer based on agreement with
homeowner); Prestance, 160 P.3d at 21 (allowing mortgagee to subrogate under
Restatement); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6(b)(4) (1997)
(allowing equitable subrogation “upon a request from the obligor”).
155. See Subrogation, supra note 44, at 686 (“[T]he liberal view leads to the
result that the only volunteer would be one who, without an invitation from any
other party and purely as a philanthropist, relieved another from an obligation.”).
25
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eliminating the volunteer element, Pennsylvania could greatly promote
refinancing and protect the interests of both lenders and borrowers.156
3. Court Uses Third Party Negligence to Rule Out Equitable Subrogation
The negligence standard applied by the court in Heller is too strict of a
standard for an equitable doctrine.157  In effect, Pennsylvania law prevents
parties from invoking equitable subrogation when prior mortgages did not
show up in their title search.158  Regardless of whether the mistake re-
sulted from third party negligence, the onus falls on the refinancing
lender.159  Following this logic, equitable subrogation would only apply
when the intervening lien was not of record.160
This philosophy eliminates a majority of circumstances when the eq-
uitable doctrine would apply.161  Furthermore, it encourages refinancing
lenders to refuse to refinance prior liens because of the major risk in-
volved.162  The Restatement recognizes that a strict interpretation of equi-
table subrogation is not necessary because the intervening lienholder is
not adversely affected by subrogation.163  In other words, the intervening
156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. b (1997) (“The
meaning of the term ‘volunteer’ is highly variable and uncertain, and has engen-
dered considerable confusion.”).
157. See Starr, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that standard for equitable subroga-
tion is “culpable and inexcusable neglect” in failing to protect senior priority
position).
158. See Heller 863 A.2d at 1155 (defining Ameriquest’s “problem” as negli-
gence in title searching).
159. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 21 (explaining that rule that strictly punishes
negligence “swallows the doctrine” of equitable subrogation).
160. See id. (“If all persons who negligently confer an economic benefit upon
another are disqualified from equitable relief because of their negligence, then
the law of restitution, which was conceived in order to prevent unjust enrichment,
would be of little or no value.” (quoting Ex Parte AmSouth Mortg. Co., 679 So.2d
251, 255 (Ala. 1996))).
161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. e (1997) (“The
most common context for this sort of subrogation is the ‘refinancing’ of a mort-
gage loan”); Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 315 (describing minority ap-
proach to equitable subrogation as “the most hostile to the refinancing lender”).
While Pennsylvania does not apply the minority approach, its volunteer rule and
negligence standard place the burden on the lender. See also Ominsky, supra note
26 (noting that lender who extends loan in order to pay off earlier loans is “volun-
teer” under Pennsylvania law).
162. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 305–06 (arguing that making
equitable subrogation available liberally can “eliminate the risk that intervening
liens . . . will take priority over refinancing mortgage”).  Moreover, the authors
posit that adopting the Restatement approach would greatly reduce the need for
new title insurance when refinancing. See id. (noting advantages of Restatement
approach to equitable subrogation).
163. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. a (1997) (“The
holders of intervening interests can hardly complain about this result, for they are
no worse off than before the senior obligation was discharged.”); see also id. § 7.6
cmt. e (concluding that holders of intervening interests are not materially
prejudiced by subrogation in refinancing context).
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lienholder is in no worse position because it did not expect to be in a
priority position.164  Therefore, negligence on behalf of an attorney or
title searcher should not preclude a lender from taking advantage of equi-
table subrogation.165
IV. WHAT’S NEXT AFTER HELLER?: MOVING TOWARD THE RESTATEMENT
Pennsylvania’s current precedent establishes an inequitable approach
to equitable subrogation.166  It restricts the doctrine in the refinancing
context, thus limiting its most valuable purpose.167  In order for Penn-
sylvania to adapt to the changing economic climate, it must adopt the Re-
statement approach to equitable subrogation.168
A. Pennsylvania Continues to Follow Inequitable Precedent
Pennsylvania courts continue to follow the precedent established in
Heller.169  For example, in 1313466 Ontario, Inc. v. Carr,170 the court held
that a refinancing lender could not be equitably subrogated to a prior lien
position.171  In Carr, Jeffrey Carr, a homeowner, received a loan from U.S.
Bank, which he used to pay off three prior loans.172  Nevertheless, Carr
164. See id. § 7.6 cmt. e (explaining that payor will have benefit of subrogation
to mortgage that was discharged only if payor was promised repayment of funds
and reasonably expected to receive senior mortgage).
165. See id. (noting that under Restatement, subrogation can be granted even
if payor had actual knowledge of intervening interest).  The critical inquiry is
“whether the payor reasonably expected to get security with a priority equal to the
mortgage being paid.” Id.  Thus, third party negligence should not affect this ex-
pectation. See id. (stating that “payor’s notice . . . is not necessarily relevant”).
166. See, e.g., 1313466 Ontario, Inc. v. Carr, 954 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2008) (providing example of how Pennsylvania’s approach precludes homeowners
from receiving refinancing loans if there are intervening liens).
167. See First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153, 1160 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004) (holding that refinancing mortgagee precluded from equitable
subrogation).
168. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 353 (arguing that widespread
adoption of Restatement will help both homeowners and lenders).
169. See Carr, 954 A.2d at 2 (holding that case was indistinguishable from re-
cent case in Heller, and thus bank in question was not entitled to relief under equi-
table subrogation).  The Carr court noted that Pennsylvania’s interpretation of the
doctrine of equitable subrogation places lenders in a dilemma, because if the inter-
vening lienholder refuses to subrogate lien position, the lienholder  will not be
able to refinance the homeowner’s loan. See id. at 5–6; see also Newcrete Prods. v.
City of Wilkes-Barre, 37 A.3d 7, 15 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (explaining that “Penn-
sylvania’s doctrine allows a party who satisfies an encumbrance to assume the same
priority position as the holder of the prior encumbrance” (citing generally First
Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004))).
170. 954 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
171. See id. at 5 (holding that bank was not entitled to equitable subrogation
because it was acting as volunteer).
172. See id. at 1–2 (explaining that Carr used U.S. Bank loan to pay off three
prior loans).  The proceeds of the U.S. Bank loan were used to pay off Lendent
and Household loans, and another unsecured loan. See id.
27
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failed to satisfy an additional mortgage on the property, of which U.S.
Bank was completely unaware.173  When Carr defaulted on his loan pay-
ments, the mortgagee in priority position foreclosed on Carr’s home.174
The intervening lienholder was now threatening U.S. Bank’s interest in
the property.175  U.S. Bank petitioned to intervene in the foreclosure ac-
tion by making an argument for equitable subrogation.176  However, the
court found that U.S. Bank was not entitled to relief because it was a vol-
unteer in the matter and because its own negligence caused it to overlook
the intervening lien.177  The court in Carr followed the precedent estab-
lished in Home Owners’ and Heller, and it reiterated the State’s policy on
equitable subrogation.178  Accordingly, Pennsylvania law has been unable
to adapt to the changing needs of homeowners, and the increase of refi-
nancing in the current housing market.179
B. The National Trend Toward the Restatement Approach
Recent state court cases demonstrate a national trend toward adopt-
ing the Restatement approach to equitable subrogation.180  The courts
that have adopted the Restatement approach support it because it favors
lenders, prevents unjust enrichment, and ensures that secondary
lienholders do not receive windfalls.181  Furthermore, the Restatement al-
lows for uniform application of the doctrine and limits the uncertainty
173. See id. at 2 (“U.S. Bank was unaware of the Ontario mortgage due to an
error in its title search.”).
174. See id. (explaining that Carr defaulted on his payments for Ontario mort-
gage, who then obtained two judgments in mortgage foreclosure).
175. See id. (detailing Carr’s defaults on his payments and discussing Onta-
rio’s subsequent foreclosure action).
176. See id. (acknowledging two judgments secured by Ontario in foreclosure
actions, in which U.S. Bank sought to intervene).
177. See id. at 5 (finding that facts were indistinguishable from Home Owners’
and Heller, and that U.S. Bank constituted volunteer under analysis from both
cases).
178. See id. (noting that decision was guided by principle of stare decisis, but
also by  U.S. Bank’s negligence).
179. See Armour, supra note 13 (noting that refinancing applications made up
about eighty-five percent of all mortgage applications in 2008); see also Ominsky,
supra note 26 (noting that under Pennsylvania law, lender must not have acted as
volunteer to be entitled to equitable subrogation).
180. See, e.g., Green v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc. (In re Green), 474 B.R. 790,
795 (Bankr. D. Md. 2012) (finding lender that refinanced debtor’s obligation on
existing, first-priority lien was entitled to be equitably subrogated to rights of first-
position lienholder); Citimortgage, Inc. v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 813
N.W.2d 332, 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that “equitable subrogation is
available to place a new mortgage in the same priority as a discharged mortgage”);
Bank of Am. v. Prestance Corp., 160 P.3d 17, 18 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (holding
that refinancing mortgagee’s actual or constructive notice of intervening liens
does not prevent application of equitable subrogation).
181. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 18 (adopting Restatement approach to equita-
ble subrogation); see also Murray, supra note 25, at 255 (noting that court in
Prestance dismissed argument that Restatement approach “‘would obstruct the pre-
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and variability of other approaches.182  Thus, equitable subrogation is
more predictable under the Restatement, which only requires that it pre-
vent unjust enrichment.183  Many states have adopted the Restatement to
promote refinancing and curb the threat of foreclosure.184
In one such prominent state court case, Bank of America, N.A. v.
Prestance Corp.,185 the Washington Supreme Court adopted the Restate-
ment approach to equitable subrogation.186  In Prestance, homeowners
took out a loan from Wells Fargo to satisfy multiple prior liens on their
home, including a priority lien from Washington Mutual.187  Wells Fargo
believed it would take priority over the other loans that its proceeds were
used to satisfy; however, one loan remained that it was not subordinate
to.188  The Washington Supreme Court applied the Restatement ap-
proach, finding that Wells Fargo was entitled to subrogate to first priority
lien position in the amount of the loan paid off.189  The Prestance court
recognized that the Restatement approach was not yet the majority posi-
tion, but found it to be the most equitable stance.190  The court concluded
that the purpose of equitable subrogation was to prevent a person from
dictability and stability of the  recording act’” (quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v.
Prestance Corp., 160 P.3d 17, 22–24 (Wash. 2007) (en banc))).
182. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. a (1997) (conclud-
ing that “[s]ubrogation is a broad concept . . . . in which one who performs a
mortgage is entitled to subrogation in order to avoid unjust enrichment”).  The
Restatement approach eliminated the volunteer rule, which it noted caused “con-
siderable confusion.” Id. § 7.6 cmt. b.  Furthermore, the Restatement requires the
subrogee to have performed in order to protect some “interest,” but not a legally
recognized property interest. See id. (noting that “a business or financial interest
that would be impaired by foreclosure of the mortgage, an interest in reputation,
or a moral obligation” would suffice).
183. See id. § 7.6(a) (“One who fully performs an obligation of another, se-
cured by a mortgage, becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the
mortgage to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.”).
184. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 353 (arguing that widespread
adoption of Restatement approach is likely to lead to substantial savings for refi-
nancing homeowners).  The article notes a recent trend in courts being favorable
to Restatement. See id. (noting that continuation of trend is desirable for home-
owners who desire to receive substantial savings).
185. 160 P.3d 17 (Wash. 2007) (en banc).
186. See id. at 29 (adopting Section 7.6 of Restatement and holding that
lender was entitled to equitable subrogation).
187. See id. at 19 (explaining that homeowners’ applied for million dollar
loan from Wells Fargo to pay off their home purchase loan).  Wells Fargo ap-
proved the million dollar home equity line of credit in December 2001. See id.
(noting that Wells Fargo secured loan with deed of trust).
188. See id. (reporting that Wells Fargo expected to take first lien position on
the home).
189. See id. at 20 (finding that equitable subrogation preserves proper priori-
ties by keeping first mortgage first and second mortgage second).
190. See id. (noting that courts were initially resistant to equitable subroga-
tion, but now many courts apply doctrine liberally).
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receiving “an unearned windfall at the expense of another.”191  Further-
more, the court found that the Restatement readily applied in the context
of conventional refinancing, which it saw as commonplace in today’s econ-
omy.192  Moreover, the court concluded that denying equitable subroga-
tion based on the knowledge of intervening interests “runs contrary to the
purposes underlying the doctrine.”193  Ultimately, the court found that
the Restatement provided the most equitable and sensible approach, al-
lowing subrogation regardless of actual or constructive knowledge of inter-
vening liens.194
More recently, in Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Norcutt,195 the Arizona Supreme
Court adopted the Restatement approach.196  In Norcutt, Dean and Stacey
Norcutt purchased a home for cash and satisfied the mortgage on the
property.197  However, the couple later discovered that they purchased the
home subject to a judgment lien that far exceeded the property’s value.198
Prior to Norcutt, Arizona courts applied the same volunteer rule as Penn-
sylvania.199  Nevertheless, the court adopted the Restatement approach
because of the ambiguity in Arizona case law regarding equitable subroga-
tion.200  The court found that equitable subrogation should not turn on
whether a person invoking the doctrine was labeled a volunteer.201  Fi-
191. Id. at 21 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. a
(1997)) (reasoning that Restatement properly emphasizes equitable subrogation’s
concern of unjust enrichment).
192. See id. at 25 (citing Bank of N.Y. v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644, 653 (Ind.
2005)) (agreeing with Restatement approach in context of conventional refinanc-
ing).  The court noted that refinancing was “common place” in the current econ-
omy. Id. (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644, 653 (Ind. 2005))
(acknowledging that refinancing lender expects to receive same security as loan
being paid off).
193. Id. (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644, 653 (Ind. 2005)).
194. See id. at 29 (adopting Restatement and holding that Wells Fargo was
equitably subrogated to first-priority lien, regardless of actual or constructive
knowledge of intervening liens).
195. 274 P.3d 1204 (Ariz. 2012) (en banc).
196. See id. at 1209 (adopting Restatement approach, and rejecting agree-
ment requirement for equitable subrogation).  The court held that equitable sub-
rogation “does not turn on contractual principles, but instead on the concern to
prevent unjust enrichment.” Id. (granting subrogation regardless of express or
implied agreement).
197. See id. at 1206 (describing Dean and Stacey Norcutt’s home purchase).
198. See id. (holding that purchasers were equitably subrogated to mortgage
lien’s priority in amount paid to satisfy mortgage).
199. See id. at 1207 (noting that prior precedent stated “[a] mere volunteer,
who has no rights to protect, may not claim the right of subrogation” (quoting
Mosher v. Conway, 46 P.2d 110, 113 (Ariz. 1935)).  For a discussion of Penn-
sylvania’s approach, specifically the requirement that a party seeking equitable sub-
rogation must not be a volunteer, see supra notes 169–79 and accompanying text.
200. See id. (finding that Restatement approach was “most consistent with the
rationale for equitable subrogation”).
201. See id. at 1208 (holding that Arizona case law was consistent with Restate-
ment approach, which refuses to use term “volunteer” as talisman).  Further, the
court agreed with the Restatement insofar as “[T]he meaning of the term ‘volun-
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nally, the court concluded that the goal of equitable subrogation was
preventing unjust enrichment and acknowledged that denying subroga-
tion in this case would grant a windfall to the judgment lienholder.202
C. Pennsylvania Must Change Its Approach to Equitable Subrogation
The volunteer rule in Pennsylvania’s current law is not only out-of-
date, but it defeats the purpose of equitable subrogation.203  Penn-
sylvania’s approach prevents equitable subrogation in all third party refi-
nancing circumstances.204  The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent
unjust enrichment, which Pennsylvania’s current approach completely
fails to do.205  A liberal application of equitable subrogation is essential to
prevent junior lienholders from gaining an undeserved windfall.206  Fur-
thermore, Pennsylvania causes buyers and lenders to suffer substantial
losses by denying equitable subrogation in the refinancing context.207  As
the court found in Prestance, the purpose of equitable subrogation is to
preserve the rightful lien position of lenders.208  Accordingly, adopting
the Restatement approach will encourage refinancing and allow home-
owners to take full advantage of low interest rates.209  Moreover, Penn-
teer’ is highly variable and uncertain, and has engendered considerable confu-
sion.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS.
§ 7.6 cmt. b (1997)).
202. See id. at 1209 (“Equitable subrogation, however, does not turn on con-
tractual principles, but instead on the concern to prevent unjust enrichment.”).
The court noted that the Restatement “appropriately focuses” on circumstances
surrounding subrogation. See id. at 1208 (looking at party’s interest in property).
203. See Subrogation, supra note 44, at 684 (suggesting that volunteer require-
ment should be abandoned, and equitable subrogation doctrine expanded).
204. See Ominsky, supra note 26 (“A lender who extends a loan in order to pay
off earlier loans is a ‘volunteer’ . . . because the lender was ‘an entirely voluntary
agent with no interest in the property . . . .’” (quoting 1313466 Ontario, Inc. v.
Carr, 954 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008))).
205. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. a (1997) (“Subroga-
tion is an equitable remedy designed to avoid a person’s receiving an unearned
windfall at the expense of another.”).
206. See Bank of Am. v. Prestance Corp., 160 P.3d 17, 20 (Wash. 2007) (en banc)
(“It rests upon the maxim that no one shall be enriched by another’s loss, and may
be invoked wherever justice and good conscience demand its application in oppo-
sition to the technical rules of law.” (quoting Cox v. Wooten Bros. Farms, Inc., 610
S.W.2d 278, 280 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981))).
207. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 363 (arguing that widespread
adoption of Restatement approach is likely to lead to substantial savings for refi-
nancing homeowners).  Furthermore, the authors argue that the Restatement ap-
proach is the “fairest” because it rejects conferring a windfall to intervening
lienholders. See id. at 327.
208. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 28 (concluding that allowing subrogation pro-
vides incentive for lenders to advance loans to borrowers in order to avoid forfei-
ture).  Moreover, the court found that the Restatement approach “affords
enormous financial benefits for many homeowners.” Id. (noting that potential sav-
ings amount to billions of dollars).
209. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 327 (“[T]he Restatement ap-
proach is friendly to first mortgage refinancing, a process that clearly is beneficial
31
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sylvania should relinquish the volunteer rule and base decisions on equity
rather than actual or constructive notice.210  By adopting the Restatement
approach, Pennsylvania would protect the rights of lenders and preserve
the proper role of equity in refinancing transactions.211
Furthermore, adoption of the Restatement would facilitate refinanc-
ing and help curb the threat of foreclosure.212  The court in Prestance rec-
ognized that a liberal application of equitable subrogation encourages
lenders to refinance loans and allows property owners to avoid forfei-
ture.213  In addition, the Restatement approach affords tremendous finan-
cial benefits to homeowners by allowing seamless refinancing.214  In the
current state of the economy it is vital to encourage refinancing because it
allows homeowners to maximize the value in their home.215  Moreover,
adopting the Restatement approach would limit the costs of title insurance
for refinancing transactions, which would save borrowers over a billion
dollars.216  Equitable subrogation protects both lenders and borrowers,
to homeowners.”).  The authors strongly urge the adoption of the Restatement
approach to equitable subrogation, arguing that it should become the predomi-
nant approach.  See id. at 327–28 (noting that Restatement approach has gained
considerable ground).
210. See Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Norcutt, 274 P.3d 1204, 1208 (Ariz. 2012) (en
banc) (finding that person who pays debt to protect person’s interests is not volun-
teer).  The court makes clear that the volunteer rule is “highly variable and uncer-
tain, and has engendered considerable confusion.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. b (1997)).
211. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 353 (noting that lenders and
title insurers both support adoption of Restatement for equitable subrogation be-
cause it dramatically reduces financial risk associated with refinancing and lessens
threat of intervening lienholder taking priority position).  The authors ultimately
conclude that the Restatement approach should be enacted by Congress in the
form of legislation. See id. at 366.
212. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 28 (“[B]y facilitating more refinancing, equita-
ble subrogation helps stem the threat of foreclosure.”).  The court notes that other
courts have liberally applied equitable subrogation in order to prevent forfeiture.
See id.
213. See id. (“By allowing subrogation there is an incentive for one to advance
sums to help a property owner avoid forfeiture.” (quoting Klotz v. Klotz, 440
N.W.2d 406, 410 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989))).
214. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 365–66 (“[T]itle insurance costs
in residential mortgage refinancings represent billions of dollars annually—costs
that are now borne overwhelmingly by homeowners.”).  The authors recognize
that the potential savings from adopting the Restatement could approach billions
of dollars. See id. at 366.
215. See Mortgages and the Markets, supra note 8 (recognizing that refinancing
provides economic stimulus by lowering borrowers’ mortgage payments and in-
creasing their expendable income).
216. See Prestance, 160 P.3d at 28 (“Title insurance primarily ensures there are
no intervening liens, and when a jurisdiction adopts the liberal view of equitable
subrogation, the insurance premium is greatly reduced.”).  The court recognized
that the savings from title insurance premiums would be passed to homeowners.
See id. (citing Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 365).
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and Pennsylvania must adopt the Restatement approach in order to pro-
mote confidence in the struggling housing market.217
The court in Carr presents a compelling case-in-point of the need for
Pennsylvania to adopt the Restatement approach, and also suggests a way
forward.218  The court noted that Carr would not be able to refinance his
mortgage with an intervening loan on the property.219  Furthermore,
under Pennsylvania law, if Carr knew of the intervening lien, neither he
nor the bank could take advantage of equitable subrogation.220  As the
court noted, Pennsylvania’s application of equitable subrogation “may be
ripe for legislative review.”221
The dilemma that Carr faced was a frequent problem for homeown-
ers during the mortgage crisis.222  Therefore, if Pennsylvania wants to pro-
tect homeowners against foreclosure, it must promote refinancing.223
The first step Pennsylvania must take is adopting the Restatement ap-
proach to equitable subrogation.224  In doing so, Pennsylvania will allow
borrowers and lenders to protect their individual interests and capitalize
on improving conditions in the housing market.225
217. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 327 (“Restatement approach is
friendly to first mortgage refinancing, a process that clearly is beneficial to
homeowners.”).
218. See 1313466 Ontario, Inc. v. Carr, 954 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008)
(explaining that Carr could not refinance his home if he was aware of intervening
lien); id. at 6 (alluding to legislative adoption of Restatement approach).
219. See id. (noting that if bank was aware of intervening mortgage then it
would not have extended loan to Carr to refinance his home).
220. See id. (noting that U.S. Bank would not have extended loan to Carr if it
knew of the intervening lien).  The court explains that under the Pennsylvania
approach neither Carr nor U.S. Bank could take advantage of equitable subroga-
tion, leaving Carr unable to refinance his home altogether. See id.
221. Id. at 6.
222. See id. at 5–6 (“This scenario may be a frequent dilemma for homeown-
ers amidst the current mortgage crisis, where 1.3 million housing properties were
subjected to foreclosure activity in 2007, and estimates predict that capital losses in
housing may reach into the trillions of dollars in the coming years.” (footnote
omitted)).  The court recognized the millions of homes foreclosed upon, and thus
the importance of refinancing. See id. (suggesting legislative review for Penn-
sylvania’s equitable subrogation approach).
223. See Stiglitz & Zandi, supra note 6 (explaining that with interest rates at
record lows, mass mortgage refinancing would allow homeowners to drastically re-
duce their monthly payments and chance of default).  The authors highlight the
benefit homeowners receive from refinancing. See id. (noting that majority of
Americans are great candidates).
224. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 327–28 (“[A]s a normative mat-
ter, we strongly urge the adoption of the Restatement subrogation rule.  It has
already gained considerable ground, and we believe and hope it is well on its way
to becoming the predominant rule.”).  The authors note that the widespread
adoption of the Restatement approach would lead to substantial savings for refi-
nancing homeowners. See id.
225. See Ensign, supra note 18 (encouraging homeowners to refinance and
take advantage of historically low interest rates); see also Nelson & Whitman, supra
33
McGillivray: What's Your Priority? Revitalizing Pennsylvania's Approach to Equ
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-2\VLR204.txt unknown Seq: 34  8-APR-13 11:27
334 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 301
V. CONCLUSION
Without the opportunity to refinance her home, Jan and her children
would have been forced out onto the street.226  In order to reduce the
chances of this occurring, Pennsylvania must adopt a more liberal ap-
proach to equitable subrogation.227  Pennsylvania’s current equitable sub-
rogation law makes refinancing an extremely risky decision for lenders.228
The goal of equitable subrogation is to prevent intervening lienholders
from receiving an undeserved windfall, which the Pennsylvania approach
does not do.229  In order to allow borrowers to take full advantage of the
benefits of refinancing, Pennsylvania must adopt the Restatement ap-
proach.230  In doing so, Pennsylvania would follow a growing trend in the
country and provide an outlet to those homeowners who want take advan-
tage of low interest rates.231  In a housing market that is still recovering
from a crushing recession, it is imperative that Pennsylvania adopt an ap-
note 16, at 327 (concluding that Restatement approach for equitable subrogation
is “fairest” and friendly to first mortgage refinancing).
226. See Foreclosure Statistics, supra note 13 (reporting spike in foreclosures dur-
ing 2008, and describing problems homeowners face when dealing with
foreclosure).
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. e (1997) (“The
most common context for this sort of subrogation is the ‘refinancing’ of a mort-
gage loan.”).  The most frequent occurrence is when a payor is given a mortgage,
but without subrogation, it would be subordinate to some intervening lien. See id.
(describing significance of priority and explaining role equitable subrogation
plays).
228. See Ominsky, supra note 26 (“[I]n Pennsylvania ‘[t]he payor must have
acted on compulsion, and it is only in cases where the person paying the debt of
another will be liable in the event of a default or is compelled to pay in order to
protect his own interests, or by virtue of legal process, that equity substitutes him in
the place of the creditor without any agreement . . . .’” (second alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting 1313466 Ontario, Inc. v. Carr, 954 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008))).
229. See id. § 7.6 cmt. a (“Subrogation is an equitable remedy designed to
avoid a person’s receiving an unearned windfall at the expense of another.”); see
also Murray, Trend, supra note 45, at 19 (explaining that doctrine of equitable sub-
rogation “rests on the equitable maxim that no one shall be enriched by another’s
loss,” and noting it “is designed to prevent an unjust forfeiture on one hand and a
windfall amounting to unjust enrichment on the other”).
230. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 305 (finding that majority of
refinancing expenses can be substantially reduced or eliminated by implementing
Restatement).  Further, the authors state that making subrogation available liber-
ally can eliminate risk that intervening liens will take priority over refinancing
mortgage. See id. at 305–06 (noting that adopting Restatement would greatly re-
duce need for title insurance when refinancing).
231. See, e.g., Sourcecorp, Inc. v. Norcutt, 274 P.3d 1204, 1207 (Ariz. 2012)
(en banc) (adopting Third Restatement approach to equitable subrogation be-
cause it is most consistent with rationale of doctrine); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Mortg.
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 813 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (finding
that case law in Michigan was consistent with Restatement approach with regard to
refinancing); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Prestance Corp., 160 P.3d 17, 29 (Wash. 2007)
(en banc) (adopting Restatement approach in context of conventional refinancing
and holding that equitable subrogation applied regardless of actual or constructive
knowledge).
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proach to equitable subrogation that facilitates refinancing.232  By adopt-
ing the Restatement approach, Pennsylvania would provide freedom to
homeowners, security to lenders, and economic development to all.233
232. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 7.6 cmt. e (1997) (“Ordi-
narily lenders who provide refinancing desire and expect [primary lien position],
even if they are aware of an intervening lien.”).
233. For a critique of Pennsylvania’s current approach, see supra notes
121–65 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the Restatement approach and
why Pennsylvania should adopt it, see supra notes 166–225 and accompanying text.
See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 16, at 363 (concluding that widespread adop-
tion of Restatement approach to subrogation and refinancing transactions is
proper normative matter and will lead to substantial savings for refinancing home-
owners).  Adopting the Restatement approach would eliminate the risk of losing
mortgage priority for refinancing lenders. See id. at 365 (advocating for reform of
law of mortgage refinancing and concluding that Restatement approach should be
enacted through federal legislation).
35
McGillivray: What's Your Priority? Revitalizing Pennsylvania's Approach to Equ
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-2\VLR204.txt unknown Seq: 36  8-APR-13 11:27
336 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 301
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss2/4
